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An event study of the Rhenish-Westphalian Coal Syndicate

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  • BITTNER, THOMAS
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    Abstract

    This article applies event-study methodology to explore the economic consequences of cartelisation in Imperial Germany. By combining qualitative and quantitative sources it discusses the risk and return effects of the establishment of the allegedly most powerful cartel, the Rhenish-Westphalian Coal Syndicate (RWKS). Its findings cast doubts on the importance of the RWKS for the development of the German coal industry. The cartel did not affect the major part of a typical mine s risk-the firm-specific risk and its moderate return effects were mostly confined to larger mines. Cartelisation did not seem to be an important pillar of organised capitalism .

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Cambridge University Press in its journal European Review of Economic History.

    Volume (Year): 9 (2005)
    Issue (Month): 03 (December)
    Pages: 337-364

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    Handle: RePEc:cup:ereveh:v:9:y:2005:i:03:p:337-364_00

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    Cited by:
    1. Bayer, Christian & Burhop, Carsten, 2009. "Corporate governance and incentive contracts: Historical evidence from a legal reform," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 46(4), pages 464-481, October.
    2. Anupam Nanda & Stephen L. Ross, 2008. "The Impact of Property Condition Disclosure Laws on Housing Prices: Evidence from an Event Study using Propensity Scores," Working papers 2008-39, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    3. Thorsten Lübbers, 2009. "Is Cartelisation Profitable? A Case Study of the Rhenish Westphalian Coal Syndicate, 1893-1913," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2009_09, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    4. Lübbers, Thorsten, 2008. "Shareholder value mining: Wealth effects of takeovers in German coal mining, 1896-1913," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 45(4), pages 462-476, September.

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