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An event study of the Rhenish-Westphalian Coal Syndicate

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Author Info
BITTNER, THOMAS
Abstract

This article applies event-study methodology to explore the economic consequences of cartelisation in Imperial Germany. By combining qualitative and quantitative sources it discusses the risk and return effects of the establishment of the allegedly most powerful cartel, the Rhenish-Westphalian Coal Syndicate (RWKS). Its findings cast doubts on the importance of the RWKS for the development of the German coal industry. The cartel did not affect the major part of a typical mine s risk-the firm-specific risk and its moderate return effects were mostly confined to larger mines. Cartelisation did not seem to be an important pillar of organised capitalism .

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File URL: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S1361491605001541
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Cambridge University Press in its journal European Review of Economic History.

Volume (Year): 9 (2005)
Issue (Month): 03 (December)
Pages: 337-364
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:cup:ereveh:v:9:y:2005:i:03:p:337-364_00

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  1. Christian Bayer & Carsten Burhop, 2008. "Corporate Governance and Incentive Contracts: Historical Evidence from a Legal Reform," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2008_11, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Thorsten Lübbers, 2009. "Is Cartelisation Profitable? A Case Study of the Rhenish Westphalian Coal Syndicate, 1893-1913," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2009_09, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-10-21.


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