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Flexibility mechanisms and credit discounting

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  • Shin, Sungwhee
  • Suh, Sang-Chul

Abstract

We consider the international treaties on climate change as self-enforcing agreements. Applying non-cooperative game theory, we interpret the UN framework Convention on Climate Change as a Nash equilibrium outcome of an international abatement game where only domestic abatement is allowed. The Kyoto Protocol is a Nash equilibrium outcome of the game where flexibility mechanisms are introduced. We also show that credit discounting on foreign abatement can Pareto improve the welfare of all countries.

Suggested Citation

  • Shin, Sungwhee & Suh, Sang-Chul, 2003. "Flexibility mechanisms and credit discounting," Environment and Development Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 8(2), pages 247-260, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:endeec:v:8:y:2003:i:02:p:247-260_00
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    1. Pradhan, Shreekar & Ale, Bhakta Bahadur & Amatya, Vishwa Bhusan, 2006. "Mitigation potential of greenhouse gas emission and implications on fuel consumption due to clean energy vehicles as public passenger transport in Kathmandu Valley of Nepal: A case study of trolley bu," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 31(12), pages 1748-1760.

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