IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cup/endeec/v1y1996i04p445-464_00.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Efficient emission reduction through joint implementation

Author

Listed:
  • Babu, P. G.
  • Saha, Bibhas

Abstract

This paper models joint implementation (JI) for emission reduction between a developed and a developing country. When the per unit price of JI abatement is negotiated, the relative pay-offs deviate from the ratio of bargaining powers. When firms bargain, country-wise gains can increase with a greater abatement target. But if the governments bargain, the developing country's gains increase at the expense of the developed country as the target increases. However, the Pareto optimal JI can be achieved only when the governments negotiate over both abatement and transfer.

Suggested Citation

  • Babu, P. G. & Saha, Bibhas, 1996. "Efficient emission reduction through joint implementation," Environment and Development Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 1(4), pages 445-464, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:endeec:v:1:y:1996:i:04:p:445-464_00
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S1355770X00000802/type/journal_article
    File Function: link to article abstract page
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Fischer, Carolyn, 2005. "Project-based mechanisms for emissions reductions: balancing trade-offs with baselines," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 33(14), pages 1807-1823, September.
    2. Fischer, Carolyn, 2002. "Determining Project-Based Emissions Baselines with Incomplete Information," RFF Working Paper Series dp-02-23, Resources for the Future.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cup:endeec:v:1:y:1996:i:04:p:445-464_00. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Kirk Stebbing (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cambridge.org/ede .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.