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Invisible inequality leads to punishing the poor and rewarding the rich

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  • HAUSER, OLIVER P.
  • KRAFT-TODD, GORDON T.
  • RAND, DAVID G.
  • NOWAK, MARTIN A.
  • NORTON, MICHAEL I.

Abstract

Four experiments examine how lack of awareness of inequality affect behaviour towards the rich and poor. In Experiment 1, participants who became aware that wealthy individuals donated a smaller percentage of their income switched from rewarding the wealthy to rewarding the poor. In Experiments 2 and 3, participants who played a public goods game – and were assigned incomes reflective of the US income distribution either at random or on merit – punished the poor (for small absolute contributions) and rewarded the rich (for large absolute contributions) when incomes were unknown; when incomes were revealed, participants punished the rich (for their low percentage of income contributed) and rewarded the poor (for their high percentage of income contributed). In Experiment 4, participants provided with public education contributions for five New York school districts levied additional taxes on mostly poorer school districts when incomes were unknown, but targeted wealthier districts when incomes were revealed. These results shed light on how income transparency shapes preferences for equity and redistribution. We discuss implications for policy-makers.

Suggested Citation

  • Hauser, Oliver P. & Kraft-Todd, Gordon T. & Rand, David G. & Nowak, Martin A. & Norton, Michael I., 2021. "Invisible inequality leads to punishing the poor and rewarding the rich," Behavioural Public Policy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 5(3), pages 333-353, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:bpubpo:v:5:y:2021:i:3:p:333-353_4
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    Cited by:

    1. Chen, Wei & Zhu, Qianlong & Wu, Te, 2023. "Unfairness promotes the evolution of cooperation," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 438(C).
    2. Michael Foley & Rory Smead & Patrick Forber & Christoph Riedl, 2021. "Avoiding the bullies: The resilience of cooperation among unequals," PLOS Computational Biology, Public Library of Science, vol. 17(4), pages 1-18, April.
    3. Rémi Suchon & Vincent Theroude, 2022. "Inequality and cooperation: meta-analytical evidence from Public Good Experiments," Post-Print hal-04053417, HAL.
    4. Rahwan, Zoe & Hauser, Oliver P. & Kochanowska, Ewa & Fasolo, Barbara, 2018. "High stakes: A little more cheating, a lot less charity," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 276-295.
    5. Jinzhuo Liu & Mao Peng & Yunchen Peng & Yong Li & Chen Chu & Xiaoyu Li & Qing Liu, 2021. "Effects of inequality on a spatial evolutionary public goods game," The European Physical Journal B: Condensed Matter and Complex Systems, Springer;EDP Sciences, vol. 94(8), pages 1-7, August.
    6. Bradley D Mattan & Denise M Barth & Alexandra Thompson & Oriel FeldmanHall & Jasmin Cloutier & Jennifer T Kubota, 2020. "Punishing the privileged: Selfish offers from high-status allocators elicit greater punishment from third-party arbitrators," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 15(5), pages 1-20, May.

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