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How Do Observers Assess Resolve?

Author

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  • Kertzer, Joshua D
  • Renshon, Jonathan
  • Yarhi-Milo, Keren

Abstract

Despite a plethora of theoretical frameworks, IR scholars have struggled with the question of how observers assess resolve. We make two important contributions in this direction. Conceptually, we develop an integrative framework that unites otherwise disconnected theories, viewing them as a set of heuristics actors use to simplify information-rich environments. Methodologically, we employ a conjoint experiment that provides empirical traction impossible to obtain using alternative research designs. We find that ordinary citizens are ‘intuitive deterrence theorists’ who focus to a great extent on capabilities, stakes, signals and past actions in judging resolve. We also find that observers see democracies as less resolved than autocracies (not more), casting doubt on key propositions of democratic credibility theory. Finally, a conceptual replication shows that a group of elite decision makers converge with the US public in how they interpret costly signals, and in viewing democracies as less resolved than autocracies.

Suggested Citation

  • Kertzer, Joshua D & Renshon, Jonathan & Yarhi-Milo, Keren, 2021. "How Do Observers Assess Resolve?," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 51(1), pages 308-330, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:bjposi:v:51:y:2021:i:1:p:308-330_17
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    Cited by:

    1. Seok Joon Kim, 2022. "Quick on the Draw: American Negativity Bias and Costly Signals in International Relations," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 66(2), pages 246-271, February.
    2. Allan Dafoe & Remco Zwetsloot & Matthew Cebul, 2021. "Reputations for Resolve and Higher-Order Beliefs in Crisis Bargaining," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 65(7-8), pages 1378-1404, August.
    3. Casey Crisman-Cox, 2022. "Democracy, reputation for resolve, and civil conflict," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 59(3), pages 382-394, May.

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