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Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and Free Trade

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  • Gowa, Joanne

Abstract

Recent literature typically attributes the relative scarcity of open international markets to the prisoner's dilemma structure of state preferences with respect to trade. I argue that the prisoner's dilemma representation does not reflect the most critical aspect of free trade agreements in an anarchic international system: security externalities. Explicit consideration of these effects suggests that a bipolar international political system has an advantage relative to its multipolar counterpart with respect to the opening of markets among states. Less credible exit threats and stronger incentives to engage in altruism within its alliances explain the advantage of a two-power system.

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  • Gowa, Joanne, 1989. "Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and Free Trade," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 83(4), pages 1245-1256, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:83:y:1989:i:04:p:1245-1256_08
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    Cited by:

    1. Michelle A. Benson, 2005. "The Relevance of Politically Relevant Dyads in the Study of Interdependence and Dyadic Disputes," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 22(2), pages 113-133, April.
    2. James D. Morrow, 1997. "When Do “Relative Gains†Impede Trade?," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 41(1), pages 12-37, February.
    3. Robert Pahre & Paul A. Papayoanou, 1997. "Using Game Theory to Link Domestic and International Politics," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 41(1), pages 4-11, February.
    4. Rolf J. Langhammer, 2010. "Unordnung in der internationalen Handelsordnung: Befunde, Gründe, Auswirkungen und Therapien," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 11(1), pages 75-98, February.
    5. Tobias Böhmelt, 2010. "The Impact of Trade on International Mediation," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 54(4), pages 566-592, August.
    6. D. MacLaren, 1991. "Agricultural Trade Policy Analysis And International Trade Theory: A Review Of Recent Developments," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(3), pages 250-297, September.
    7. Guanyi Leu, 2011. "ASEAN’s Preferential Trade Agreements (PTA) Strategy," Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, Institute of Asian Studies, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg, vol. 30(2), pages 31-64.
    8. Daniel Albalate & Germà Bel & Ferran A. Mazaira-Font & Xavier Ros-Oton, 2023. "Paying for Protection: Bilateral Trade with an Alliance Leader and Defense Spending of Minor Partners," IREA Working Papers 202317, University of Barcelona, Research Institute of Applied Economics, revised Nov 2023.
    9. Christina L. Davis & Tyler Pratt, 2021. "The forces of attraction: How security interests shape membership in economic institutions," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 16(4), pages 903-929, October.
    10. Teng, Jimmy, 2012. "Military competition and size and composition of economy and government," MPRA Paper 37968, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 05 Apr 2012.
    11. Rafael Reuveny & John Maxwell, 1998. "Free Trade and Arms Races," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 42(6), pages 771-803, December.
    12. Stephen J. Majeski & Shane Fricks, 1995. "Conflict And Cooperation in International Relations," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 39(4), pages 622-645, December.

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