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The Nature of Utility Functions in Mass Publics

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  • Brady, Henry E.
  • Ansolabehere, Stephen

Abstract

Survey data are used to test the basic tenets of rational choice theory. We find that (1) voters' preferences are orderly but voters do not always have preferences. When the perceived difference between two candidates is below some threshold, voters are indifferent between them. (2) Most voters choose candidates whose issue positions are congruent with their own. (3) Lack of knowledge about candidates affects choice and utility through two routes—indifference and risk aversion.Most voters have highly structured utility functions, but the thresholds and risk aversion in these functions place relatively unknown candidates at a disadvantage in presidential primaries and other electoral situations. Moreover, the importance of knowledge in these functions suggests that social choice theorists must take seriously the classic concerns of public opinion research—the operation of the media and the dynamics of information in elections.

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  • Brady, Henry E. & Ansolabehere, Stephen, 1989. "The Nature of Utility Functions in Mass Publics," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 83(1), pages 143-163, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:83:y:1989:i:01:p:143-163_08
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    Cited by:

    1. Selb, Peter & Herrmann, Michael & Munzert, Simon & Schübel, Thomas & Shikano, Susumu, 2013. "Forecasting runoff elections using candidate evaluations from first round exit polls," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 541-547.
    2. Christopher Hare & Tzu-Ping Liu & Robert N. Lupton, 2018. "What Ordered Optimal Classification reveals about ideological structure, cleavages, and polarization in the American mass public," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 176(1), pages 57-78, July.
    3. Regenwetter, Michel & Marley, A. A. J. & Grofman, Bernard, 2002. "A general concept of majority rule," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 405-428, July.
    4. James F. Adams & Ernest W. Adams, 2000. "The Geometry of Voting Cycles," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 12(2), pages 131-153, April.
    5. Freeman, John R., 1996. "A Computable Equilibrium Model for the Study of Political Economy," Bulletins 7484, University of Minnesota, Economic Development Center.
    6. Tapki, Ipek Gursel, 2007. "Revealed incomplete preferences under status-quo bias," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 274-283, May.
    7. Sivan Frenkel, 2014. "Competence and ambiguity in electoral competition," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 159(1), pages 219-234, April.
    8. Robert Smith, 1992. "Action embedded in social structure: A systematic theory Part I, theory and evidence," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 181-204, May.
    9. Harold D. Clarke & Euel Elliott & Barry J. Seldon, 1994. "A Utility Function Analysis of Competing Models of Party Support," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 6(3), pages 289-305, July.
    10. Michel Regenwetter & James Adams & Bernard Grofman, 2002. "On the (Sample) Condorcet Efficiency of Majority Rule: An alternative view of majority cycles and social homogeneity," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 53(2), pages 153-186, September.

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