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The Paradox of Minimax Regret

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  • Beck, Nathaniel

Abstract

The introduction of decision making under uncertainty by Ferejohn and Fiorina is an interesting addition to the literature on rational theories of citizen participation. Decision making under uncertainty assumes, however, that the actor has no knowledge of the probabilities of the various outcomes; this is obviously no more true than the assumption of perfect information about these probabilities made in the decision making under risk model. Voters have some, but not perfect, information about the probabilities of at least some of the different possible outcomes. Specifically, let us look at the two-party case. In Ferejohn's notation, (p 3 + p 4) is the probability of an individual's vote making a difference. We might expect a rational citizen to know that this probability is at most minuscule, even if he cannot calculate its exact value.

Suggested Citation

  • Beck, Nathaniel, 1975. "The Paradox of Minimax Regret," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 69(3), pages 918-918, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:69:y:1975:i:03:p:918-918_24
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Ming Li & Dipjyoti Majumdar, 2010. "A Psychologically Based Model of Voter Turnout," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 12(5), pages 979-1002, October.
    2. Henry S. Farber, 2009. "Rational Choice and Voter Turnout: Evidence from Union Representation Elections," Working Papers 1200, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
    3. Henry S. Farber, 2009. "Rational Choice and Voter Turnout: Evidence from Union Representation Elections," Working Papers 1185, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
    4. Fred Thompson, 1982. "Closeness counts in horseshoes and dancing ... and elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 38(3), pages 305-316, January.
    5. repec:agr:journl:v:3(604):y:2015:i:3(604):p:63-74 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Herrmann, Oliver & Jong-A-Pin, Richard & Schoonbeek, Lambert, 2019. "A prospect-theory model of voter turnout," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 362-373.
    7. repec:pri:cepsud:196farber is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Henry S. Farber, 2009. "Rational Choice and Voter Turnout: Evidence from Union Representation Elections," Working Papers 1200, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
    9. Douglas D. Roscoe, 2014. "Yes, Raise My Taxes: Property Tax Cap Override Elections," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 95(1), pages 145-164, March.
    10. Henry S. Farber, 2010. "Rational Choice and Voter Turnout: Evidence from Union Representation Elections," NBER Working Papers 16160, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Henry S. Farber, 2009. "Rational Choice and Voter Turnout: Evidence from Union Representation Elections," Working Papers 1185, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
    12. Mihai UNGUREANU & Andra ROESCU, 2015. "Economic models of voting: an empirical study on the electoral behavior in Romanian 2012 parliamentary elections," Theoretical and Applied Economics, Asociatia Generala a Economistilor din Romania - AGER, vol. 0(3(604), A), pages 63-74, Autumn.
    13. Farber, Henry S, 2010. "Rational Choice and Voter Turnout: Evidence from Union Representation Elections," IZA Discussion Papers 5033, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    14. T. Tideman, 1985. "Remorse, elation, and the paradox of voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 46(1), pages 103-106, January.

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