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The Guardianship Dilemma: Regime Security through and from the Armed Forces—ERRATUM

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  • MCMAHON, R. BLAKE
  • SLANTCHEV, BRANISLAV L.

Abstract

Owing to an editorial oversight, the citation and reference for Piplani and Talmadge (2015) was deleted twice on page 307 of the May 2015 issue of American Political Science Review. The citations should read as follows: In this context, it is useful to consider the empirical results of two studies that find that the probability of coups is lower if the country is involved in a war (Piplani and Talmadge, 2015) and even in a crisis (Arbatli and Arbatli, 2014). The explanatory mechanisms these studies offer are different (although not necessarily incompatible): Piplani and Talmadge (2015) argue that when the military is engaged in a war there are fewer opportunities for a coup and more uncertainty about who will join it, whereas Arbatli and Arbatli (2014) argue that crises allow rulers to commit credibly to transfers to the military and to generate rally-around-the-flag effects. Also, owing to a printer's error on page 305, Qaddafi is misspelled as Qaddaf. We regret these errors.

Suggested Citation

  • Mcmahon, R. Blake & Slantchev, Branislav L., 2015. "The Guardianship Dilemma: Regime Security through and from the Armed Forces—ERRATUM," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 109(3), pages 636-636, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:109:y:2015:i:03:p:636-636_00
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Abel Escribà -Folch & Tobias Böhmelt & Ulrich Pilster, 2020. "Authoritarian regimes and civil–military relations: Explaining counterbalancing in autocracies," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 37(5), pages 559-579, September.
    2. Jun Koga Sudduth, 2021. "Who Punishes the Leader? Leader Culpability and Coups during Civil War," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 65(2-3), pages 427-452, February.
    3. Jacque Gao, 2021. "Solving the guardianship dilemma by war," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 33(4), pages 455-474, October.
    4. Charles Crabtree & Holger L Kern & David A Siegel, 2020. "Cults of personality, preference falsification, and the dictator’s dilemma," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 32(3), pages 409-434, July.
    5. Sheng, Yumin, 2023. "Patronage and authoritarian co-optation of the military: Theory with evidence from post-Mao China," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 167(C).
    6. Roya Izadi, 2022. "State Security or Exploitation: A Theory of Military Involvement in the Economy," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 66(4-5), pages 729-754, May.
    7. Adam Scharpf & Christian Gläßel, 2020. "Why Underachievers Dominate Secret Police Organizations: Evidence from Autocratic Argentina," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 64(4), pages 791-806, October.
    8. Camarena, Kara Ross, 2022. "Repatriation during conflict: A signaling analysis," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 158(C).
    9. Cullen S. Hendrix & Idean Salehyan, 2017. "A House Divided," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 61(8), pages 1653-1681, September.
    10. Paul Lorenzo Johnson & Ches Thurber, 2020. "The Security-Force Ethnicity (SFE) Project: Introducing a new dataset," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 37(1), pages 106-129, January.

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