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Does market coordination lead to justice or to strict efficiency in Social Choice and Individual Values?


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  • Irène Berthonnet


  • Vincent Desreumaux


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    The paper tries to clarify the status of the market in Social Choice and Individual Values. It shows how Arrow at first intended to propose a third theorem of welfare economics (Feldman [1991]), which would show that the market achieves not only Pareto-optimality, but also equitable social allocations. The impossibility theorem proves this is impossible. Arrow’s solution to impossibility is interpreted here as a further limitation of the market’s objectives. At the end of the book, the market is presented as a technical mechanism that guarantees economic efficiency, if it doesn’t take individual values into consideration.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by L'Harmattan in its journal Cahiers d'économie Politique.

    Volume (Year): (2014)
    Issue (Month): 66 ()
    Pages: 95-126

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    Handle: RePEc:cpo:journl:y:2014:i:66:p:95-126

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    Related research

    Keywords: Impossibility theorem; welfare economics; values; social welfare function; economic efficiency.;

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