The article focuses on a tension in the Hayekian representation of legal rules. While rules perform an essential function of coordination by providing common interpretation about the legitimate expectations, Hayek does not really develop the mechanisms by which common interpretations may emerge. Firstly, the functions of coordination of rules are presented. We show then that rules are constituted by individual meanings. Finally we show none of the two mechanisms producing shared interpretations, the sense of justice and the judge, is able to guarantee the resolution of conflicts of interpretation between individuals. Such a conflict questions therefore spontaneous order's efficiency and justice.
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Article provided by Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Paris in its journal Cahiers d'économie Politique.
Volume (Year): (2008) Issue (Month): 54 (Jan - Jun) Pages: 57-83 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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Find related papers by JEL classification: B20 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - General K0 - Law and Economics - - General