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Alianzas y política: un juego entre agentes civiles y armados

Author

Listed:
  • María del Pilar Castillo
  • Boris Salazar

Abstract

Resumen: Uno de los propósitos de los agentes armados en guerras irregulares es reemplazar al Estado en el monopolio de la violencia y en la protección de la población civil. Este trabajo pretende mostrar que ese objetivo sólo lo pueden lograr si los agentes armados construyen alianzas con grupos de la población civil, ¿cómo se pueden formar esas alianzas? Se propone un ejercicio formal, representado por un juego, en el que un agente armado y un agente civil revisan sus decisiones acerca de la pertinencia de la alianza. De los resultados del mismo, se derivan las condiciones necesarias y suficientes para la existencia de alianzas estables.

Suggested Citation

  • María del Pilar Castillo & Boris Salazar, 2007. "Alianzas y política: un juego entre agentes civiles y armados," Revista Lecturas de Economía, Universidad de Antioquia, CIE, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:col:000174:004654
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    Keywords

    alianzas; teoría de juegos;

    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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