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Leadership selection, internal promotion, and bureaucratic corruption in less developed polities

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Author Info
James E. Rauch

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Abstract

The establishment of a professional government bureaucracy in place of political appointees is an important component of an enabling environment for private enterprise. I show that internal promotion can help to bring to power individuals who highly value (relative to income) imposition of their preferences over collective goods on the public. Such individuals restrain the corruption of their subordinates as a byproduct of their efforts to implement their preferences using tax revenue. As a result, large-scale and petty corruption tend to move together and both tend to be lower the longer the practice of internal promotion has been in place.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Canadian Economics Association in its journal Canadian Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 34 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 240-258
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Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:34:y:2001:i:1:p:240-258

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Related research
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption

Cited by:
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  1. Audrey Hu & Liang Zhou, 2007. "Selecting less Corruptible Bureaucrats," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 07-096/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2008-9-30.

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