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Trigger Strategies in Chinese Agricultural Teams

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  • Xiao-Yuan Dong

Abstract

In this paper, the reasons why Chinese agricultural teams could not reply on the threat of internal effort response to solve incentive problems are investigated. The detrimental effects of state extractive agricultural policies, the basic needs program, and Cultural-Revolution-era ideology on the dynamic self-enforcing mechanism in Chinese teams are analysed. Using the data on the teams of a moderately prosperous commune during the period 1970-76, the author estimates the discount factor and the impact of the trigger strategies on workers' effort decisions. It is found that the estimates of the discount factor and the trigger strategy effect are significantly greater than zero in some periods, but not large enough to eliminate the need for monitoring.

Suggested Citation

  • Xiao-Yuan Dong, 1998. "Trigger Strategies in Chinese Agricultural Teams," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 31(2), pages 465-490, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:31:y:1998:i:2:p:465-490
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Paolo Crosetto & Alexia Gaudeul & Gerhard Riener, 2012. "Partnerships, Imperfect Monitoring and Outside Options: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Jena Economics Research Papers 2012-052, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    2. Paolo Crosetto & Alexia Gaudeul & Gerhard Riener, 2012. "Partnerships, Imperfect Monitoring and Outside Options: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Jena Economics Research Papers 2012-052, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • P32 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Collectives; Communes; Agricultural Institutions

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