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Optimum Trade Policies and Retaliation

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  • Kenneth S. Chan

Abstract

The present paper examines a two-country, noncooperative game in which the choice of trade policies (i.e., tariffs, quota, etc.) is consider ed as part of the overall game strategies. Using a class of constant elasticity offer curves, the author finds that the Nash-equilibrium t rade policies are those that can make the offer curves the most elast ic. When the choice set of trade policies expands, this Nash equilibr ium approaches the free trade equilibrium in the limit.

Suggested Citation

  • Kenneth S. Chan, 1988. "Optimum Trade Policies and Retaliation," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 21(2), pages 427-433, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:21:y:1988:i:2:p:427-33
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    Cited by:

    1. Gaisford, James D. & Kerr, William A., 1992. "Which Country Loses The Least In A Trade War?," Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 36(3), pages 1-26, December.
    2. Nakanishi, Noritsugu, 1999. "Reexamination of the International Export Quota Game through the Theory of Social Situations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 132-152, April.

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