IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ces/ifosdt/v67y2014i12p20-25.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Lessons from the Financial Crisis, Part Two: What Can Be Done?

Author

Listed:
  • Martin Schütte

Abstract

In his commentary Martin Schütte, former HypoVereinsbank/Bayer. Hypotheken- and Wechsel-Bank and University of Munich, notes that five years after the onset of the financial crisis, the latter may have become a government debt crisis, but the reasons for this crisis - as well as the risks and measures required to address it - remain largely the same as they were at the outset. For the main players, namely governments and central banks, have adopted the rightly castigated behavioural patterns, instruments and products, as well as the market manipulation used at the time, on almost a one-to-one basis. In his opinion, the policy pursued by governments, the EU and the ECB to date cannot solve the debt crisis. Extensive debt restructuring of the indebted states must take place, the option to exit the euro and rejoin at a later date must be made possible and the unification process – by all means featuring different groupings – should be pursued further.

Suggested Citation

  • Martin Schütte, 2014. "Lessons from the Financial Crisis, Part Two: What Can Be Done?," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 67(12), pages 20-25, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ifosdt:v:67:y:2014:i:12:p:20-25
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.ifo.de/DocDL/ifosd_2014_12_2.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hans-Werner Sinn, 2013. "Verantwortung der Staaten und Notenbanken in der Eurokrise," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 66, pages 03-33, June.
    2. Franz-Christoph Zeitler & Marcel Fratzscher & Dietrich Murswiek & Manfred J.M. Neumann & Markus C. Kerber, 2014. "The German Constitutional Court’s Ruling on the ECB’s OMT Programme," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 67(06), pages 03-25, March.
    3. Hans-Werner Sinn, 2013. "The Responsibility of States and Central Banks in the Euro Crisis," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 66(1), pages 03-33, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Winkler, Adalbert, 2013. "Der lender of last resort vor Gericht," Frankfurt School - Working Paper Series 206, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management.
    2. Nikolay Hristov & Oliver Hülsewig & Thomas Siemsen & Timo Wollmershäuser, 2014. "Smells Like Fiscal Policy? Assessing the Potential Effectiveness of the ECB's OMT Program," CESifo Working Paper Series 4628, CESifo.
    3. Martin Hellwig, 2019. "Target-Falle oder Empörungsfalle? – Zur deutschen Diskussion um die Europäische Währungsunion," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2019_05, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    4. Siekmann, Helmut, 2015. "The legality of outright monetary transactions (OMT) of the European system of central banks," IMFS Working Paper Series 90, Goethe University Frankfurt, Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS).
    5. Winkler, Adalbert, 2014. "The lender of last resort in court," Frankfurt School - Working Paper Series 207, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management.
    6. Winkler Adalbert, 2018. "Zehn Jahre nach dem Konkurs von Lehman Brothers: Ordnungspolitische Irrtümer in der Bewertung der EZB-Geldpolitik seit der globalen Finanzkrise," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 19(2), pages 141-162, July.
    7. Ansgar Belke, 2013. "Non-Standard Monetary Policy Measures – Magic Wand or Tiger by the Tail?," Ruhr Economic Papers 0447, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
    8. Sinn Hans-Werner, 2019. "Der Streit um die Targetsalden : Kommentar zu Martin Hellwigs Artikel „Target-Falle oder Empörungsfalle?“," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 20(3), pages 170-217, September.
    9. Paul Welfens, 2016. "Overcoming the euro crisis and prospects for a political union," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 59-103, January.
    10. Adalbert Winkler, 2014. "Finance, growth and crisis — A European perspective," Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy, Springer;ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics;Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), vol. 49(2), pages 88-94, March.
    11. Belke Ansgar, 2013. "Non-Standard Monetary Policy Measures – Magic Wand or Tiger by the Tail?," Review of Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 64(3), pages 341-368, December.
    12. Martin F. Hellwig, 2014. "Financial Stability, Monetary Policy, Banking Supervision, and Central Banking," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2014_09, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    13. Adalbert Winkler, 2014. "Rescues Violating the German Constitution:The Federal Court Decides on a Theory of Finance," FMG Special Papers sp231, Financial Markets Group.
    14. repec:zbw:rwirep:0447 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Wolf, Marvin, 2013. "Währungsunionen und Allmendeproblem," Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) dp-521, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
    16. Franz-Christoph Zeitler & Marcel Fratzscher & Dietrich Murswiek & Manfred J.M. Neumann & Markus C. Kerber, 2014. "The German Constitutional Court’s Ruling on the ECB’s OMT Programme," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 67(06), pages 03-25, March.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E51 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Money Supply; Credit; Money Multipliers
    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ces:ifosdt:v:67:y:2014:i:12:p:20-25. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Klaus Wohlrabe (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ifooode.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.