Accords de pêche UE-ACP : le rôle de la compensation financière et des coalitions dans le partage de la rente halieutique

Since the late 1970s, the fishing agreements between the EU fleets and ACP (African, Caribbean, Pacific) countries include a monetary compensation for the fishing access rights. Unfortunately, these agreements are far from being profitable for the less developed countries (LDCs) because of a too large dependence regarding EU funds. A classical game theory approach (fishwar model ; Levhari-Mirman 1980) is revisited to take into consideration the macroeconomic dependence of ACP countries and analyse the role of coalitions and negotiation procedures in the rent-sharing process. In a 3-player game (two LDCs and the EU), the impact of a LDC coalition is analysed in terms of welfare gain/loss outcomes and re-allocation of catches between countries. A « small-step » negotiation procedure is first used to solve the cases of failure, before, in case of a new failure, using a multi-country mediation out of the coalition. One of the main results lies in the low incentives for LDCs to join the coalition in spite of the bilateral or multilateral mediations, as long as the LDCs do not have the same interest to harvest their own resources.