La manipulation stratégique des règles de vote : une étude expérimentale
AbstractTheoretical analysis of the voting rules susceptibility to strategic manipulation suggests that the choice of the best rule (the less vulnerable to manipulation) is closely related to the underlying notion of equilibrium that is used. A crucial question is to know whether or not the possibility of reacting to a threat of manipulation should be taken in consideration. We investigate this question using laboratory experiments. We find empirical support for the specific notion of reaction. JEL code: C9, D72.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by De Boeck Université in its journal Recherches économiques de Louvain.
Volume (Year): 75 (2009)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
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Web page: http://www.cairn.info/revue-recherches-economiques-de-louvain.htm
social choice; voting rules; strategic manipulation; experiments;
Other versions of this item:
- Virginie Béhue & Pierre Favardin & Dominique Lepelley, 2009. "La manipulation stratégique des règles de vote : une étude expérimentale," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 2009044, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
- C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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- Karine Van der Straeten & Jean-François Laslier & Nicolas Sauger & André Blais, 2010.
"Strategic, sincere, and heuristic voting under four election rules: an experimental study,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer, vol. 35(3), pages 435-472, September.
- Blais, André & Laslier, Jean-François & Sauger, Nicolas & Van Der Straeten, Karine, 2009. "Strategic, Sincere and Heuristic Voting under Four Election Rules: An Experimental Study," IDEI Working Papers 559, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Blais, André & Laslier, Jean-François & Sauger, Nicolas & Van Der Straeten, Karine, 2009. "Strategic, Sincere and Heuristic Voting under Four Election Rules: An Experimental Study," TSE Working Papers 09-065, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- André Blais & Jean-François Laslier & Nicolas Sauger & Karine Van Der Straeten, 2008. "Sincere, strategic, and heuristic voting under four election rules: An experimental study," Working Papers hal-00335046, HAL.
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