Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

La manipulation stratégique des règles de vote : une étude expérimentale

Contents:

Author Info

  • Virginie Béhue
  • Pierre Favardin
  • Dominique Lepelley

Abstract

Theoretical analysis of the voting rules susceptibility to strategic manipulation suggests that the choice of the best rule (the less vulnerable to manipulation) is closely related to the underlying notion of equilibrium that is used. A crucial question is to know whether or not the possibility of reacting to a threat of manipulation should be taken in consideration. We investigate this question using laboratory experiments. We find empirical support for the specific notion of reaction. JEL code: C9, D72.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=REL_754_0503
Download Restriction: restricted

File URL: http://www.cairn.info/revue-recherches-economiques-de-louvain-2009-4-page-503.htm
Download Restriction: restricted

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by De Boeck Université in its journal Recherches économiques de Louvain.

Volume (Year): 75 (2009)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 503-516

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:cai:reldbu:rel_754_0503

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.cairn.info/revue-recherches-economiques-de-louvain.htm

Related research

Keywords: social choice; voting rules; strategic manipulation; experiments;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Blais, André & Laslier, Jean-François & Sauger, Nicolas & Van Der Straeten, Karine, 2009. "Strategic, Sincere and Heuristic Voting under Four Election Rules: An Experimental Study," IDEI Working Papers 559, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  2. André Blais & Jean-François Laslier & Nicolas Sauger & Karine Van Der Straeten, 2008. "Sincere, strategic, and heuristic voting under four election rules: An experimental study," Working Papers hal-00335046, HAL.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cai:reldbu:rel_754_0503. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.