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Compétition en équipe. Les hommes sont-ils moins coopératifs que les femmes ?

Author

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  • Marie-Pierre Dargnies

Abstract

What makes the members of a team cooperate is a question essential to labor economists and is all the more important when teams are competing against each others. In this case, having some team members free-ride weakens the team?s chances of winning. A recent literature shows that men and women differ in their taste for evolving in competitive environments. The present paper studies men and women?s behavior when offered the option to enter a team-based competition depending on the modalities of team composition. While women do not choose to enter the tournament significantly more often when it is team-based, men and, more specifically, high-performing men, enter significantly less as part of a team than alone. The results suggest that men?s withdrawal from team-based competition could come from their fear of being subjected to free-riding on the part of their teammate. Classification JEL : D81, C91.

Suggested Citation

  • Marie-Pierre Dargnies, 2011. "Compétition en équipe. Les hommes sont-ils moins coopératifs que les femmes ?," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 62(1), pages 113-125.
    • Handle: RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_621_0113
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    Cited by:

    1. Migheli, Matteo, 2015. "Gender at work: Incentives and self-sorting," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 10-18.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior

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