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Entente partielle dans un appel d'offres au premier prix

Author

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  • Karine Brisset

Abstract

This paper deals with collusive behavior among a subset of bidders in a first price sealed-bid auction. The analysis shows that cartel?s bid is always less aggressive than outsiders? bids, when outsiders are aware or not from the presence of a collusion. We prove that the first price auction gives the auctioneer a greater expected revenue than the second price auction in the presence of an incomplete collusion when outsiders are not aware from the collusion. Classification JEL : D44, D82.

Suggested Citation

  • Karine Brisset, 2002. "Entente partielle dans un appel d'offres au premier prix," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 53(1), pages 29-41.
    • Handle: RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_531_0029
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    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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