Bill and Keep as the Efficient Interconnection Regime?
AbstractIn this paper I review the recent paper by DeGraba (2000) that proposes a version of Bill and Keep (called COBAK) as the efficient interconnection regime. I argue while the proposed interconnection regime is suitable for some types of interconnection it would be quite undesirable for others. I show that whether the COBAK approach is suitable for a particular type of interconnection depends on, among other things, the importance of network externalities and on the willingness of called parties versus calling parties to pay for calls.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by De Gruyter in its journal Review of Network Economics.
Volume (Year): 1 (2002)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.degruyter.com
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Harbord, David & Pagnozzi, Marco, 2008. "On-Net/Off-Net Price Discrimination and 'Bill-and-Keep' vs. 'Cost-Based' Regulation of Mobile Termination Rates," MPRA Paper 14540, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Elena GALLO, 2008. "Is There a "Right" Charging Principle with the NGN Advent?," Communications & Strategies, IDATE, Com&Strat dept., vol. 1(72), pages 33-50, 4th quart.
- Dewenter, Ralf & Kruse, Jörn, 2010.
"Calling party pays or receiving party pays? The diffusion of mobile telephony with endogenous regulation,"
DICE Discussion Papers
10, Heinrich‐Heine‐Universität Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
- Dewenter, Ralf & Kruse, Jörn, 2011. "Calling party pays or receiving party pays? The diffusion of mobile telephony with endogenous regulation," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 107-117, March.
- Ingo Vogelsang, 2003. "Price Regulation of Access to Telecommunications Networks," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(3), pages 830-862, September.
- Cunningham, Brendan M. & Alexander, Peter J. & Candeub, Adam, 2010. "Network growth: Theory and evidence from the mobile telephone industry," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 91-102, March.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Peter Golla).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.