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Private or Public Law Enforcement? The Case of Digital Anti-Piracy Policies with Illegal Non-Monitored Behaviors

Author

Listed:
  • Darmon Eric

    (University of Rennes 1, CREM (UMR CNRS 6211) and University of Augsburg, 7 Place Hoche, 35065 Rennes Cedex, France)

  • Le Texier Thomas

    (University of Rennes 1 and CREM (UMR CNRS 6211), 7 Place Hoche, 35065 Rennes Cedex, France)

Abstract

Should rights be publicly or privately enforced in the case of digital piracy? The emergence of large-scale anti-piracy laws and the existence of illegal non-monitored channels raise important issues for the design of anti-piracy policies. We study the impact of these demand-side policies in two enforcement settings (namely, public and private enforcement settings) with an outside adoption option for users of an illegal non-monitored channel. Our results show that public enforcement generates higher monitoring and lower price levels, and also higher legal welfare than private enforcement. However, we identify potential conflicts of interest between the legal seller and the social planner when the efficiency of the illegal non-monitored channel is low. Introducing supply-side policies, i.e. policies targeted to suppliers of illegal content, we find that they may have unexpected impacts and can damage legal welfare. We also identify situations in which the two policies are substitutes or complements.

Suggested Citation

  • Darmon Eric & Le Texier Thomas, 2016. "Private or Public Law Enforcement? The Case of Digital Anti-Piracy Policies with Illegal Non-Monitored Behaviors," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 15(4), pages 169-210, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:rneart:v:15:y:2016:i:4:p:169-210:n:1
    DOI: 10.1515/rne-2016-0027
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Bae Sang Hoo & Yoo Kyeongwon, 2021. "Is Imitation Bad for the Production of Creative Works?," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 19(2), pages 115-144, January.
    2. McKenzie, Jordi & Crosby, Paul & Cox, Joe & Collins, Alan, 2019. "Experimental evidence on demand for “on-demand” entertainment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 161(C), pages 98-113.
    3. Martínez-Sánchez, Francisco, 2020. "Preventing commercial piracy when consumers are loss averse," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 53(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    copyright infringement; demand-side policy; digital piracy; law enforcement; monitoring; regulation; supply-side policy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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