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Quid Pro Quo! Organization Theoretical Remarks about FIFA’s Legitimacy Under Blatter and Infantino

Author

Listed:
  • Richau Lukas
  • Emrich Eike
  • Follert Florian

    (Saarland University, Faculty of Human and Business Sciences (HW), Homburg, Saarland, Germany)

Abstract

This article addresses the question of the legitimacy of sports organizations, with a particular focus on the football organization FIFA. By applying elements of the public choice theory as well as the concept of political machines to FIFA, we show that the FIFA leadership established an allocation system that works on a discretionary basis in addition to the formal rule-based allocation process. FIFA uses this exchange system to please selected member associations, which in return vote in favor of the leadership’s plans and secure its legitimacy. We further illustrate that such a system can only exist in the long run if the majority of both internal and external stakeholders approves the system.

Suggested Citation

  • Richau Lukas & Emrich Eike & Follert Florian, 2019. "Quid Pro Quo! Organization Theoretical Remarks about FIFA’s Legitimacy Under Blatter and Infantino," The Economists' Voice, De Gruyter, vol. 16(1), pages 1-9, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:evoice:v:16:y:2019:i:1:p:9:n:5
    DOI: 10.1515/ev-2019-0014
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Emrich, Eike & Pierdzioch, Christian & Pitsch, Werner, 2014. "Die "Marke" Olympia und die besondere Bedeutung von Vertrauenskriterien: Eine Geschichte von Markt, Macht und Moral," Working Papers of the European Institute for Socioeconomics 11, European Institute for Socioeconomics (EIS), Saarbrücken.
    2. Berno Buechel & Eike Emrich & Stefanie Pohlkamp, 2016. "Nobody’s Innocent," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 17(8), pages 767-789, December.
    3. Daumann, Frank & Hofmeister, Hannes, 2012. "Die Vergabe der Olympischen Spiele durch das IOC: Eine institutionenökonomische Analyse," Edition HWWI: Chapters, in: Büch, Martin-Peter & Maennig, Wolfgang & Schulke, Hans-Jürgen (ed.), Zur Ökonomik von Spitzenleistungen im internationalen Sport, volume 3, pages 147-193, Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWI).
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    Cited by:

    1. Follert Florian & Richau Lukas & Emrich Eike & Pierdzioch Christian, 2020. "Collective Decision-making: FIFA from the Perspective of Public Choice," The Economists' Voice, De Gruyter, vol. 17(1), pages 1-15, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    FIFA; organization theory; political machine; public choice theory; sports economics;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • Z28 - Other Special Topics - - Sports Economics - - - Policy

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