If Cournot oligopolists face uncertainty about the intercept of a linear demand function and if the realized market price must be non-negative, then expected demand becomes convex, which can create a multiplicity of equilibria. This note shows that if the distribution of the demand intercept has a monotone hazard rate and if another, rather weak, assumption is satisfied, then uniqueness of equilibrium is guaranteed.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
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