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Kidnap and ransom insurance: A strategically useful, often undiscussed, marketplace tool for international operations

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  • Patrick L. Brockett
  • Linda L. Golden
  • Stephan Zaparolli
  • Jack M. Lum

Abstract

With kidnaping rates rising, the disruptive forces of kidnaping threaten the stability and success of corporate investment projects and put stress on appropriate corporate governance response methodologies. While kidnaping targets vary considerably among countries where it frequently occurs, most often the goal of kidnapers is money from ransom payments. Financial consequences of a kidnap ransom payment can be severe for companies, and psychological damage can be lasting to employees and their families. Given the increasingly global nature of business and increasing expansion into less politically and legally stable emerging markets, kidnap, ransom, and extortion pose a problem for management of corporations wishing to take advantage of emerging market opportunities. Kidnap and Ransom (K&R) Insurance is a risk control technique used by about 75% of Fortune 500 companies, nongovernmental organizations, and an increasing percentage of small to medium sized companies. It is a bundled package policy that includes the purchase of an insurance policy to indemnify the company for the costs of kidnap, ransom, and extortion. Such policies can also provide protective consulting beforehand, provide crisis response and negotiation assistance, as well as psychological support services after the fact. In this paper, we describe the K&R policy, its history, other nonfinancial corporate benefits provided by K&R policies, and discuss its use by corporate managers for the benefit of corporate, financial, and personnel stability. It can also be used in course on managing international risk.

Suggested Citation

  • Patrick L. Brockett & Linda L. Golden & Stephan Zaparolli & Jack M. Lum, 2019. "Kidnap and ransom insurance: A strategically useful, often undiscussed, marketplace tool for international operations," Risk Management and Insurance Review, American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 22(4), pages 421-440, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:rmgtin:v:22:y:2019:i:4:p:421-440
    DOI: 10.1111/rmir.12134
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    References listed on IDEAS

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