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Smokescreen Politics? Ratcheting Up EU Emissions Trading in 2017

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  • Jørgen Wettestad
  • Torbjørg Jevnaker

Abstract

The reform of the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) adopted in November 2017 was surprisingly strong, given the previous opposition from central member‐states like Poland and key stakeholders like the energy‐intensive industries. The carbon price has also increased substantially since then. To explain why such major reform was possible, we present several findings with wider relevance. Importantly, all the actors pushing for a more ambitious reform benefitted from having a central, “second‐best” mechanism in place—the Market Stability Reserve (MSR)—which could be further tightened. By focusing cancelation on allowances in the MSR and taking place only after 2023, policy entrepreneurs managed to make the distribution of costs obscure and diffuse, whereas the benefits (a probable higher carbon price and related greater auctioning revenues for member‐states) were more specific and closer in time. That is what we call “smokescreen politics.” 烟幕政治?2017年加大欧盟排放交易 2017年11月采纳的欧盟排放交易体系(ETS)改革超乎预料地强烈,尽管之前例如波兰等中心成员国和包括能源密集型产业的关键利益相关者对此表示反对。碳价格自那时起便开始显著增长。为解释这类大型改革得以实现的原因,笔者提出了几项更具相关性的研究发现。重要的是,推动这场远大改革的一切行动者都受益于一个居于中心位置的“次优”机制——市场稳定储备(MSR),该机制还能被进一步收紧。通过聚焦于2023年才会生效的MSR津贴取消,政策企业家成功地将成本的分配变得模糊和分散,而收益(对成员国而言,碳价格和相关拍卖收入很有可能升高)却变得更为具体。笔者对此称之为“烟幕政治”。 ¿Política de cortinas de humo? Aumentando el comercio de emisiones de la UE en 2017 La reforma del Sistema de Comercio de Emisiones de la UE (ETS, por sus siglas en inglés) adoptada en noviembre de 2017 fue sorprendentemente fuerte, dada la oposición previa de los estados miembros centrales como Polonia y las principales partes interesadas como las industrias de uso intensivo de energía. El precio del carbono también ha aumentado sustancialmente desde entonces. Para explicar por qué fue posible una reforma tan importante, presentamos varios hallazgos con mayor relevancia. Es importante destacar que todos los actores que presionan por una reforma más ambiciosa se beneficiaron de contar con un "segundo mejor" mecanismo central (la Reserva de Estabilidad del Mercado) que podría ser más estricto. Al centrar la cancelación en las asignaciones en el MSR y llevarse a cabo solo después de 2023, los empresarios de políticas lograron que la distribución de los costos fuera confusa y difusa, mientras que los beneficios (un precio de carbono probablemente más alto y mayores ingresos de subasta relacionados para los estados miembros) fueron más específicos Y más cerca en el tiempo. Eso es lo que llamamos "política de cortinas de humo."

Suggested Citation

  • Jørgen Wettestad & Torbjørg Jevnaker, 2019. "Smokescreen Politics? Ratcheting Up EU Emissions Trading in 2017," Review of Policy Research, Policy Studies Organization, vol. 36(5), pages 635-659, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:revpol:v:36:y:2019:i:5:p:635-659
    DOI: 10.1111/ropr.12345
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    Cited by:

    1. Nan Li & Beibei Shi & Rong Kang, 2021. "Information Disclosure, Coal Withdrawal and Carbon Emissions Reductions: A Policy Test Based on China’s Environmental Information Disclosure," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(17), pages 1-24, August.
    2. Jørgen Wettestad & Lars H. Gulbrandsen, 2022. "On the Process of Including Shipping in EU Emissions Trading: Multi-Level Reinforcement Revisited," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 10(1), pages 246-255.
    3. Brendan Moore & Andrew Jordan, 2020. "Disaggregating the dependent variable in policy feedback research: an analysis of the EU Emissions Trading System," Policy Sciences, Springer;Society of Policy Sciences, vol. 53(2), pages 291-307, June.
    4. Maximilian Willner & Grischa Perino, 2022. "Beyond Control: Policy Incoherence of the EU Emissions Trading System," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 10(1), pages 256-264.
    5. Claire Dupont & Brendan Moore, 2019. "Brexit and the EU in Global Climate Governance," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 7(3), pages 51-61.
    6. Quemin, Simon & Trotignon, Raphaël, 2021. "Emissions trading with rolling horizons," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 125(C).
    7. Lars H. Gulbrandsen & Jørgen Wettestad, 2022. "Carbon Pricing Under Pressure: Withering Markets?," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 10(1), pages 230-234.
    8. Ergen, Timur & Schmitz, Luuk, 2023. "The sunshine problem: Climate change and managed decline in the European Union," MPIfG Discussion Paper 23/6, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.

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