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Incentives, Risk, and Agency Costs in the Choice of Contractual Arrangements in Agriculture

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  • Pradeep Agrawal

Abstract

The author develops a theory of the choice of contractual arrangements in agriculture by analyzing the incentives, risk‐premia, and agency (supervision and shirking) costs under different contracts using the principal–agent framework. The theory is able to explain many tenancy‐related issues, such as why sharecropping can be the optimal contract even in the presence of considerable shirking by the tiller, the predominance of sharecropping and of the 50*T*:*T*50 output share, the coexistence of sharecropping with other contracts, and the tenancy ladder.

Suggested Citation

  • Pradeep Agrawal, 2002. "Incentives, Risk, and Agency Costs in the Choice of Contractual Arrangements in Agriculture," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(3), pages 460-477, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:rdevec:v:6:y:2002:i:3:p:460-477
    DOI: 10.1111/1467-9361.00167
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    Cited by:

    1. Fernandez-Olmos, Marta & Rosell-Martinez, Jorge & Espitia-Escuer, Manuel Antonio, 2008. "Double Sided Moral Hazard and Share Contracts in agriculture," 2008 International Congress, August 26-29, 2008, Ghent, Belgium 43863, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
    2. James Andreoni, 2007. "Social Image and the 50-50 Norm: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Audience Effects," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001459, UCLA Department of Economics.
    3. Hong Bo & Ciaran Driver, 2012. "Agency Theory, Corporate Governance and Finance," Chapters, in: Michael Dietrich & Jackie Krafft (ed.), Handbook on the Economics and Theory of the Firm, chapter 11, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    4. James Andreoni & B. Douglas Bernheim, 2009. "Social Image and the 50-50 Norm: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Audience Effects," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(5), pages 1607-1636, September.
    5. Nasim, Sanval & Helfand, Steven & Dinar, Ariel, 2020. "Groundwater management under heterogeneous land tenure arrangements," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    6. James Berry & Rebecca Dizon-Ross & Maulik Jagnani, 2020. "Not Playing Favorites: An Experiment on Parental Fairness Preferences," Working Papers 2020-06, Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics.

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