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Procurement Experiments With Unknown Costs Of Quality

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  • Werner Güth
  • Radosveta Ivanova‐Stenzel
  • Sabine Kröger

Abstract

. We experimentally examine the efficiency and profitability of two different procurement auctions allowing for quality differences across products. We compare the vector auction with more competition on the sellers’ side with a half‐auction, reflecting actual procurement practice – an auction for the cheaper variant and bargaining with the contractor about the additional cost of the better quality variant. Our main hypothesis, that buyers are better off when using the vector auction instead of the half‐auction, is confirmed when quality differences of variants are large and the uncertainty of the cost difference is also large.

Suggested Citation

  • Werner Güth & Radosveta Ivanova‐Stenzel & Sabine Kröger, 2006. "Procurement Experiments With Unknown Costs Of Quality," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(2), pages 133-148, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:pacecr:v:11:y:2006:i:2:p:133-148
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0106.2006.00306.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Hoppe, Eva I. & Kusterer, David J. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Public–private partnerships versus traditional procurement: An experimental investigation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 145-166.
    2. Shivangi Chandel & Shubhro Sarkar, 2014. "Revenue non-equivalence in multidimensional procurement auctions under asymmetry," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2014-008, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.
    3. Güth Werner, 2014. "Institutional Regulation of Public Provision," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-14, March.

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