Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Policy Responses to Shifting Comparative Advantage: Designing a System of Emergency Protection

Contents:

Author Info

  • Hoekman, Bernard M
  • Leidy, Michael P

Abstract

Often procedures exist through which industries may petition their government for protection, contingent on the satisfaction of specific preconditions. The goal of this paper is to provide some guidance to policymakers wishing to create a system of contingent protection. The two major components of such a system are the preconditions and the instrument of protection to be applied. To be effective, efficient, and equitable, contingent protection needs to be nondiscriminatory and compensate affected exporters. As the existence of specific preconditions will create incentives to satisfy them, the scope for such "indirect" lobbying for protection must be minimized. Copyright 1990 by WWZ and Helbing & Lichtenhahn Verlag AG

Download Info

To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Kyklos.

Volume (Year): 43 (1990)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 25-51

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:43:y:1990:i:1:p:25-51

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0023-5962

Order Information:
Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=0023-5962

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Nelson, Douglas, 2006. "The political economy of antidumping: A survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 554-590, September.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:43:y:1990:i:1:p:25-51. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.