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Information technology and optimal firm structure

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  • Ziv, A

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Ziv, A, 2000. "Information technology and optimal firm structure," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(2), pages 297-328.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:joares:v:38:y:2000:i:2:p:297-328
    DOI: http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/2672935
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Friedman, Henry L., 2014. "Implications of power: When the CEO can pressure the CFO to bias reports," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 117-141.
    2. Hendrik Hakenes & Svetlana Katolnik, 2018. "Optimal Team Size and Overconfidence," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 27(4), pages 665-687, August.
    3. Hofmann, Christian & Indjejikian, Raffi J., 2018. "Authority and Accountability in Hierarchies," Foundations and Trends(R) in Accounting, now publishers, vol. 12(4), pages 298–403-2, December.
    4. Gill, David & Stone, Rebecca, 2015. "Desert and inequity aversion in teams," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 42-54.
    5. Henry L. Friedman & John S. Hughes & Beatrice Michaeli, 2022. "A Rationale for Imperfect Reporting Standards," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(3), pages 2028-2046, March.
    6. Gerald A. Feltham & Christian Hofmann, 2007. "Limited Commitment in Multi†agent Contracting," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 24(2), pages 345-375, June.
    7. Marschak, Thomas, 2006. "Organization Structure," MPRA Paper 81518, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Huddart, Steven & Liang, Pierre Jinghong, 2005. "Profit sharing and monitoring in partnerships," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1-3), pages 153-187, December.
    9. Oliver Dürr & Markus Nisch & Anna Rohlfing-Bastian, 2020. "Incentives in optimally sized teams for projects with uncertain returns," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 313-341, March.
    10. Peter O. Christensen & Gerald A. Feltham & Christian Hofmann & Florin Sabac, 2022. "Timeliness, Accuracy, and Relevance in Dynamic Incentive Contracts," Foundations and Trends(R) in Accounting, now publishers, vol. 17(1), pages 1-76, October.
    11. Christensen, Peter O. & Feltham, Gerald A. & Sabac, Florin, 2005. "A contracting perspective on earnings quality," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 265-294, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Accounting Information systems; Firm structure; Moral hazard; Supervisors;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • M40 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - General
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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