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Endogenous Formation Of Competitive Research Sharing Joint Ventures

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  • Patrick Greenlee

Abstract

Research sharing is an important objective of many research joint ventures. When partners share R&D but do not maximize joint profits, large consortia are more profitable than small ones, and joint ventures prefer dispersed rivals. For much of the spillover space, a coalition formation game that permits limited membership predicts that at most, three joint ventures form. Research‐sharing joint ventures improve welfare when spillovers are low, and banning research sharing joint ventures is beneficial for high spillovers. With imperfect research sharing and low spillovers, allowing only research sharing is the best industry‐wide joint venture alternative for consumer surplus.

Suggested Citation

  • Patrick Greenlee, 2005. "Endogenous Formation Of Competitive Research Sharing Joint Ventures," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(3), pages 355-391, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jindec:v:53:y:2005:i:3:p:355-391
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6427.2005.00259.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Greenlee, P., 1999. "Endogenous Formation of Competitive Research Sharing Joint Ventures," Papers 99-2, U.S. Department of Justice - Antitrust Division.
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    Cited by:

    1. Chu, Angus C. & Furukawa, Yuichi, 2011. "On the optimal mix of patent instruments," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 35(11), pages 1964-1975.
    2. Duso, Tomaso & Pennings, Enrico & Seldeslachts, Jo, 2007. "The Dynamics of Research Joint Ventures: A Panel Data Analysis," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 221, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    3. Jeitschko Thomas D. & Zhang Nanyun, 2014. "Adverse Effects of Patent Pooling on Product Development and Commercialization," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 14(1), pages 1-31, January.
    4. Ralph Siebert, 2013. "Are Ex Ante and Ex Post Licensing Agreements Useful Instruments to Lessen Uncertainty in R&D?," CESifo Working Paper Series 4535, CESifo.
    5. Dawid, Herbert & Hellmann, Tim, 2020. "R&D investments under endogenous cluster formation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 174(C), pages 253-283.
    6. Müller, Aranja & Zaby, Alexandra K., 2019. "Research joint ventures and technological proximity," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 48(5), pages 1187-1200.
    7. Chen, Yongmin & Sappington, David E.M., 2009. "Designing input prices to motivate process innovation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 390-402, May.
    8. Peter-J. Jost, 2022. "Friend or foe? Co-opetition and entrepreneurial networking," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 59(3), pages 1043-1059, October.
    9. BeomJu Park & Chang-Yang Lee, 2023. "Does R&D cooperation with competitors cause firms to invest in R&D more intensively? evidence from Korean manufacturing firms," The Journal of Technology Transfer, Springer, vol. 48(3), pages 1045-1076, June.
    10. Chiu Yu Ko & Xuyao Zhang, 2020. "Research joint venture with technology transfer," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(1), pages 341-358, February.
    11. Thomas Jeitschko & Nanyun Zhang, 2011. "Patent Pools and Product Development," Working Papers 2011-02, Towson University, Department of Economics, revised Feb 2011.
    12. Richard T. Gretz & Jannett Highfill & Robert C. Scott, 2009. "Strategic Research And Development Policy: Societal Objectives And The Corporate Welfare Argument," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 27(1), pages 28-45, January.
    13. Duso, Tomaso & Pennings, Enrico & Seldeslachts, Jo, 2010. "Learning dynamics in research alliances: A panel data analysis," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(6), pages 776-789, July.
    14. Naoto Aoyama & Emilson C.D. Silva, 2017. "Asymmetric Innovation Agreements under Environmental Regulation," CESifo Working Paper Series 6782, CESifo.
    15. Naoto Aoyama & Emilson Caputo Delfino Silva, 2022. "Endogenous Abatement Technology Agreements under Environmental Regulation," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(2), pages 1-30, April.
    16. Peter-J. Jost, 2021. "Endogenous formation of entrepreneurial networks," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 56(1), pages 39-64, January.
    17. Palsule-Desai, Omkar D., 2021. "Multi-product supply networks: Implications of intermediaries," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 292(3), pages 909-929.
    18. Dawid, Herbert & Hellmann, Tim, 2016. "R&D Investments under Endogenous Cluster Formation," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 555, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    19. Jost, Peter-J., 2011. "Joint ventures in patent contests with spillovers and the role of strategic budgeting," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 63(6), pages 605-637.

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