IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/jcmkts/v56y2018i2p267-283.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Independent Fiscal Councils: Neglected Siblings of Independent Central Banks? An EU Perspective

Author

Listed:
  • Martin Larch
  • Thomas Braendle

Abstract

Governance of monetary and fiscal policy have followed diverging paths. Since the late 1980s monetary policy has been delegated to independent central banks. By contrast, fiscal stabilization remained in political hands but has progressively been constrained by rules; the Stability and Growth Pact in the EU is a prominent case in point. While delegation and independence eliminated the inflation bias, fiscal policy still suffers from a deficit bias as enforcement of rules remains difficult. A logical extension of all attempts to progressively tie the hands of politics would be to carve out the stabilization function from the broader field of fiscal policy and to delegate it to national independent fiscal councils. Apart from addressing the political economy behind the deficit bias, such a step would facilitate a better co†ordination of macroeconomic policies in Economic and Monetary Union.

Suggested Citation

  • Martin Larch & Thomas Braendle, 2018. "Independent Fiscal Councils: Neglected Siblings of Independent Central Banks? An EU Perspective," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(2), pages 267-283, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jcmkts:v:56:y:2018:i:2:p:267-283
    DOI: 10.1111/jcms.12577
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12577
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/jcms.12577?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Julia del Amo Valor & Marcos Martín Mateos & Diego Martínez López & Javier J. Pérez, 2023. "Is the European economic governance framework too “complex”? A critical discussion," Working Papers 2023-06, FEDEA.
    2. Amélie BARBIER-GAUCHARD & Thierry BETTI & Théo METZ, 2023. "Fiscal multipliers, public debt anchor and government credibility in a behavioural macroeconomic model," Working Papers of BETA 2023-14, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    3. Debrun, Xavier, 2019. "Independent Fiscal Institutions in the European Union: Is Coordination Required?," MPRA Paper 93143, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Brändle, Thomas & Elsener, Marc, 2023. "Do fiscal rules matter? A survey on recent evidence," Working papers 2023/07, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.
    5. Amelie Barbier-Gauchard & Thierry Betti & Theo Metz, 2023. "Fiscal multipliers, public debt anchor and government credibility in a behavioural macroeconomic model," Working Papers 2023.10, International Network for Economic Research - INFER.
    6. Jankovics, László, 2021. "Költségvetési tanácsok az EU-ban - ölebek, vérebek vagy őrkutyák? [Fiscal councils in the EU: lapdogs, watchdogs or bloodhounds?]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(3), pages 251-281.
    7. Debrun, Xavier & Jonung, Lars, 2019. "Under threat: Rules-based fiscal policy and how to preserve it," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 142-157.
    8. Bethlendi, András & Lentner, Csaba & Póra, András, 2020. "Független költségvetési intézmények fejlődése a 2008-as válság után [Development of independent fiscal institutions since the crisis of 2008]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(7), pages 787-808.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jcmkts:v:56:y:2018:i:2:p:267-283. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0021-9886 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.