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Decomposing Executive Stock Option Exercises: Relative Information and Incentives to Manage Earnings

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  • David Veenman
  • Allan Hodgson
  • Bart Van Praag
  • Wei Zhang

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • David Veenman & Allan Hodgson & Bart Van Praag & Wei Zhang, 2011. "Decomposing Executive Stock Option Exercises: Relative Information and Incentives to Manage Earnings," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(5-6), pages 536-573, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jbfnac:v:38:y:2011:i:5-6:p:536-573
    DOI: j.1468-5957.2011.02239.x
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1468-5957.2011.02239.x
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Garen Markarian & Juan Santalo´, 2014. "Product Market Competition, Information and Earnings Management," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(5-6), pages 572-599, June.
    2. Tarek Abdelfattah & Mohamed Elmahgoub & Ahmed A. Elamer, 2021. "Female Audit Partners and Extended Audit Reporting: UK Evidence," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 174(1), pages 177-197, November.
    3. Loyola, Gino & Portilla, Yolanda, 2020. "Managerial compensation as a double-edged sword: Optimal incentives under misreporting," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 994-1017.
    4. Wenzhou Li & Liang Chen & Pengfei Sheng, 2022. "The tone from above: Does tunnelling by ultimate owners impinge on the relations between managerial compensation and earnings management?," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(4), pages 825-847, December.
    5. Wei Shan & Ran An, 2018. "Motives of Stock Option Incentive Design, Ownership, and Inefficient Investment," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 10(10), pages 1-19, September.
    6. Lorenzo Patelli & Matteo Pedrini, 2015. "Is Tone at the Top Associated with Financial Reporting Aggressiveness?," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 126(1), pages 3-19, January.
    7. Linxiao Liu & Harrison Liu & Jennifer Yin, 2014. "Stock Option Schedules and Managerial Opportunism," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(5-6), pages 652-684, June.
    8. Chen, Yanyan & Tian, Gary Gang & Yao, Daifei Troy, 2019. "Does regulating executive compensation impact insider trading?," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 1-20.

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