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Uncoupled Aspiration Adaptation Dynamics Into the Core

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  • Heinrich H. Nax

Abstract

Dynamics for play of transferable‐utility cooperative games are proposed that require information regarding own payoff experiences and other players’ past actions, but not regarding other players’ payoffs. The proposed dynamics provide an evolutionary interpretation of the proto‐dynamic ‘blocking argument’ (Edgeworth, 1881) based on the behavioral principles of ‘aspiration adaptation’ (Sauermann and Selten, 1962) instead of best response. If the game has a non‐empty core, the dynamics are absorbed into the core in finite time with probability one. If the core is empty, the dynamics cycle infinitely through all coalitions.

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  • Heinrich H. Nax, 2019. "Uncoupled Aspiration Adaptation Dynamics Into the Core," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 20(2), pages 243-256, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:germec:v:20:y:2019:i:2:p:243-256
    DOI: 10.1111/geer.12160
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    Cited by:

    1. Maria Montero & Alex Possajennikov, 2021. "An Adaptive Model of Demand Adjustment in Weighted Majority Games," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(1), pages 1-17, December.
    2. Sawa, Ryoji, 2021. "A prospect theory Nash bargaining solution and its stochastic stability," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 184(C), pages 692-711.
    3. Arthur Dolgopolov & Cesar Martinelli, 2021. "Learning and Acyclicity in the Market Game," Working Papers 1084, George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science.

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