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Hedge Fund Activism and Information Disclosure: the Case of Germany

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  • Peter Weber
  • Heinz Zimmermann

Abstract

Based on the German regulatory framework, we provide a more detailed picture of the information disclosure process surrounding the announcement of major shareholdings of hedge funds in listed companies. We separate price and volume effects between three event dates: the transaction date when the investor reaches a notification threshold, the announcement date when potential insiders (the target firm and the regulator) receive advance information, and the publication date when the information is officially released to the public. This separation makes it possible to analyse information and price pressure effects in some detail. The paper also documents the extent and nature of delays in hedge funds’ notification behaviour.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter Weber & Heinz Zimmermann, 2013. "Hedge Fund Activism and Information Disclosure: the Case of Germany," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 19(5), pages 1017-1050, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:eufman:v:19:y:2013:i:5:p:1017-1050
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-036X.2011.00626.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Bessler, Wolfgang & Vendrasco, Marco, 2022. "Corporate control and shareholder activism in Germany: An empirical analysis of hedge fund strategies," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
    2. Havranek, Tomas & Bajzík, Josef & Irsova, Zuzana & Novak, Jiri, 2023. "Does Shareholder Activism Create Value? A Meta-Analysis," CEPR Discussion Papers 18233, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Wei‐Huei Hsu & Sian Owen & Jo‐Ann Suchard, 2020. "The value of ongoing venture capital investment to newly listed firms," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 60(2), pages 1327-1349, June.
    4. Bessler, Wolfgang & Vendrasco, Marco, 2022. "Why do companies become hedge fund targets? Evidence from shareholder activism in Germany," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 47(PB).

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