Restructuring as a signal: a simple formalization
AbstractSeveral studies stressed that contrary to the initial expectations, state-owned firms at the beginning of the transition, undertook painful measures to adjust to the new economic environment. This paper investigates this behaviour in a simple game theoretic framework. It is argued that the massive amount of lay-offs created by state-owned firms during the initial phase of the transition can be interpreted as a signal directed to the banking sector in order to obtain more favourable financing conditions for the subsequent process of restructuring.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in its journal The Economics of Transition.
Volume (Year): 10 (2002)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
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Postal: One Exchange Square, London EC2A 2JN
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0967-0750
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Other versions of this item:
- Colombo, E., 1997. "Restructuring as a signal: a simple formalization," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 9714, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
- Colombo, Emilio, 1999. "Restructuring as a Signal: A Simple Formalization," CEPR Discussion Papers 2227, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- P31 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Socialist Enterprises and Their Transitions
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