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The Organizational Structure of Banking Supervision

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  • Charles A. E. Goodhart

Abstract

type="main" xml:lang="en"> Does it matter whether banking supervision is undertaken in-house in the Central Bank or in a separate specialised supervisory institution? After all, bank supervisors and the Central Bank must continue to work closely together wherever the supervisors are located. Nevertheless there has been a recent trend towards hiving off bank supervision to a separate agency, as in the UK. The main driving forces are the rise of the universal bank, increased conglomeration, and concerns with conflicts of interest. Such separation, however, raises questions whether systemic stability might suffer. The ethos and culture of the separate supervisor might come to focus more on conduct of business, consumer protection, issues. Potentially systemic financial crises would have to be handled by a committee. These are qualitative issues, and developed countries, with differing historical, legal and institutional backgrounds, will come to differing conclusions. But in less developed countries, more weight needs to be placed on ensuring the quality of the supervisory staff, i.e. their professional skills, independence from external pressures, and adequate funding. This tells strongly towards retaining banking supervision under the wing of the Central Bank in such emerging countries. (J.E.L.: E5, F3, G2).

Suggested Citation

  • Charles A. E. Goodhart, 2002. "The Organizational Structure of Banking Supervision," Economic Notes, Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA, vol. 31(1), pages 1-32, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecnote:v:31:y:2002:i:1:p:1-32
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/1468-0300.00070
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    Cited by:

    1. Leon Wansleben, 2021. "Divisions of regulatory labor, institutional closure, and structural secrecy in new regulatory states: The case of neglected liquidity risks in market‐based banking," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 15(3), pages 909-932, July.
    2. Demirguc-Kunt,Asli & Horvath,Balint Laszlo & Huizinga,Harry P., 2019. "Regulatory Arbitrage and Cross-Border Syndicated Loans," Policy Research Working Paper Series 9037, The World Bank.
    3. repec:cmj:journl:y:2013:i:29:gutu is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Lavinia Mihaela GUȚU & Vasile ILIE, 2013. "Banking supervision in European Union," SEA - Practical Application of Science, Romanian Foundation for Business Intelligence, Editorial Department, issue 2, pages 121-130, October.
    5. Benjamin Born & Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher, 2011. "Macroprudential policy and central bank communication," BIS Papers chapters, in: Bank for International Settlements (ed.), Macroprudential regulation and policy, volume 60, pages 107-110, Bank for International Settlements.
    6. Hans Gersbach & Volker Hahn, 2011. "Modeling Two Macro Policy Instruments - Interest Rates and Aggregate Capital Requirements," CESifo Working Paper Series 3598, CESifo.
    7. Kozlov Vladislav I., 2013. "Interconnection of the Model of Supervision Over the Financial Sector and Stability of the Banking System," Business Inform, RESEARCH CENTRE FOR INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS of NAS (KHARKIV, UKRAINE), Kharkiv National University of Economics, issue 6, pages 346-351.
    8. James R. Barth & Luis G. Dopico & Daniel E. Nolle & James A. Wilcox, 2002. "Bank Safety and Soundness and the Structure of Bank Supervision: A Cross‐Country Analysis," International Review of Finance, International Review of Finance Ltd., vol. 3(3‐4), pages 163-188, September.
    9. Mertzanis, Charilaos, 2020. "Financial supervision structure, decentralized decision-making and financing constraints," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 174(C), pages 13-37.
    10. Hülsewig, Oliver & Steinbach, Armin, 2021. "Monetary financing and fiscal discipline," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).

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