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Private Provision after Public Neglect: Bending Irrigation Markets in North Bihar

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  • Geof Wood

Abstract

Research in North‐East Bihar shows public sector irrigation management to be embodied within the prevailing cultural structures of the region, involving the intrusion of local exchange behaviour into the practices of public allocation of water. With irrigation officials in strong rent‐seeking positions over farmers, and without resort to a moral sense of community through which farmers might exert voice over official providers, opting out into private provision via tube‐well borings and pumpsets has become the exit solution. However, the propensity to make even relatively small investments in bamboo borings is dependent upon access to pumpsets. While élite families own the pumpsets in a village, some farmers may have borings on just some of their land, and others may have no borings of their own at all. Farmers therefore have to enter into multi‐layered transactions in order to secure access to timely water. Secure access to other inputs is also necessary. This study encapsulates the themes of: state versus common property resources management; the ‘incentives’ induced by costs of loyalty and the availability of exits to adopt private solutions; and the social embeddedness of behaviour when operating in interlocked, community level markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Geof Wood, 1999. "Private Provision after Public Neglect: Bending Irrigation Markets in North Bihar," Development and Change, International Institute of Social Studies, vol. 30(4), pages 775-794, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:devchg:v:30:y:1999:i:4:p:775-794
    DOI: 10.1111/1467-7660.00137
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    Cited by:

    1. Amitrajeet A. Batabyal & Hamid Beladi, 2008. "Bribery and Favoritism in Queuing Models of Rationed Resource Allocation," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 20(3), pages 329-338, July.
    2. P. B. Anand, 2003. "From conflict to co-operation: some design issues for local collective action institutions in cities," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 15(2), pages 231-243.
    3. Amitrajeet Batabyal, 2005. "On bribing and balking in a simple queuing model of resource allocation," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 16(1), pages 1-10.
    4. Amitrajeet Batabyal & Peter Nijkamp, 2004. "Favoritism in the Public Provision of Goods in Developing Countries," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 15(1), pages 1-10.
    5. Amitrajeet A. Batabyal & Seung Jick Yoo, 2007. "Corruption, Bribery, and Wait Times in the Public Allocation of Goods in Developing Countries," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(3), pages 507-517, August.
    6. Amitrajeet Batabyal & Seung Jick Yoo, 2006. "A complete characterization of mean wait times for citizens in the non-preemptive corruption regime," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 13(12), pages 759-762.
    7. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:15:y:2004:i:1:p:1-10 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:15:y:2005:i:14:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Siwan Anderson, 2011. "Caste as an Impediment to Trade," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 3(1), pages 239-263, January.
    10. Amitrajeet Batabyal, 2005. "On the allocation of commodities by queuing and the prevention of violence," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 15(14), pages 1-7.
    11. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:16:y:2005:i:1:p:1-10 is not listed on IDEAS

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