On the allocation of commodities by queuing and the prevention of violence
AbstractIn times of acute scarcity, demand for a commodity greatly exceeds its supply. In such situations, queuing mechanisms are frequently used to allocate scarce goods to citizens. However, inordinately long queues lead to excessive wait times and this can lead to violence. As such, the general purpose of this paper is to theoretically analyze the problem of preventing violence in a queuing context. To this end, we first formulate a queuing model with a finite capacity. Next, we determine the smallest capacity that will keep the likelihood of violence below an exogenously specified value. Finally, we illustrate the working of our model with a simple numerical example.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by AccessEcon in its journal Economics Bulletin.
Volume (Year): 15 (2005)
Issue (Month): 14 ()
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- O1 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development
- D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing
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- Praveen Kulshreshtha, 2003. "Rationing by Waiting, Opportunity Costs of Waiting and Bribery," Indian Economic Review, Department of Economics, Delhi School of Economics, vol. 38(1), pages 59-75, January.
- Amitrajeet A. Batabyal & Seung Jick Yoo, 2007. "Corruption, Bribery, and Wait Times in the Public Allocation of Goods in Developing Countries," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(3), pages 507-517, 08.
- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:15:y:2004:i:1:p:1-10 is not listed on IDEAS
- Amitrajeet A. Batabyal & Peter Nijkamp, 2004.
"Favoritism in the Public Provision of Goods in Developing Countries,"
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
04-013/3, Tinbergen Institute.
- Amitrajeet Batabyal & Peter Nijkamp, 2004. "Favoritism in the Public Provision of Goods in Developing Countries," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 15(1), pages 1-10.
- Lui, Francis T, 1985. "An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(4), pages 760-81, August.
- Amitrajeet Batabyal, 2005. "On bribing and balking in a simple queuing model of resource allocation," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 16(1), pages 1-10.
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