The aim is to examine the contribution which economic and quantitative analysis can make to a better understanding of the law. I concentrate on the common law action of negligence and how it is related to the optimal deterrence of accidents, rather than to the compensation of all accident victims. A critique is made of the New South Wales Law Reform Commission's proposal to prohibit negligence actions for motor vehicle accidents and to introduce a compulsory 'no-fault' scheme. An econometric analysis of new Zealand and Australian 'no-fault' schemes finds that the negligence system appears to have some deterrent effect on motor vehicle accidents. Copyright 1984 The University of Melbourne, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research.
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Article provided by The University of Melbourne, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research in its journal Australian Economic Review.