IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aejmic/v15y2023i4p1-67.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Monitor Reputation and Transparency

Author

Listed:
  • Iván Marinovic
  • Martin Szydlowski

Abstract

We study the disclosure policy of a regulator overseeing a monitor with reputation concerns. The monitor faces a manager, who chooses how much to manipulate based on the monitor's reputation. Reputational incentives are strongest for intermediate reputations. Instead of providing transparency, the regulator's disclosure policy aims to keep the monitor's reputation intermediate, even at the cost of diminished incentives. Beneficial schemes feature random delay or noisy information. Schemes that feature verifiable disclosure destroy reputational incentives. The regulator discloses more aggressively when she has better enforcement tools.

Suggested Citation

  • Iván Marinovic & Martin Szydlowski, 2023. "Monitor Reputation and Transparency," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 15(4), pages 1-67, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:15:y:2023:i:4:p:1-67
    DOI: 10.1257/mic.20220006
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/mic.20220006
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://doi.org/10.3886/E174343V1
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/mic.20220006.appx
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/mic.20220006.ds
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1257/mic.20220006?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • M42 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Auditing

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:15:y:2023:i:4:p:1-67. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Michael P. Albert (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/aeaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.