The Macroeconomics of Dr. Strangelove
AbstractThis paper examines the weapons-accumulation decisions of two adversarial countries in the context of a deterrence/conflict initiation game embedded in an overlapping-generations model. The demographic structure permits analysis of both within- and between-country intergenerational externalities caused by past weapons-accumulation decisions, as well as of intragenerational externalities from the adversary's current weap ons accumulation. Zero accumulation is a possible equilibrium with both noncooperative and cooperative behavior. Countries may also accumula te weapons to the point where conflict initiation never occurs. Pareto-improving policies are generally available but international cooperation need not be Pareto-improving. Copyright 1993 by American Economic Association.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 83 (1993)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
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