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An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects: Comment

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  • Noriaki Okamoto

Abstract

Ausubel (2004) introduces a new ascending-bid auction rule for multiple homogeneous objects, called the Ausubel auction, which is a dynamic counterpart of the Vickrey auction. He claims that in the Ausubel auction with private values, sincere bidding by all bidders is an ex post perfect equilibrium. However, we show that this claim does not hold in general by providing a counterexample. We then modify the Ausubel auction so that sincere bidding by all bidders is an ex post perfect equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Noriaki Okamoto, 2018. "An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 108(2), pages 555-560, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:108:y:2018:i:2:p:555-60
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.20160970
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Takehito Masuda & Ryo Mikami & Toyotaka Sakai & Shigehiro Serizawa & Takuma Wakayama, 2022. "The net effect of advice on strategy-proof mechanisms: an experiment for the Vickrey auction," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 25(3), pages 902-941, June.
    2. Ryuji Sano, 2021. "Dynamic communication mechanism design," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 57(1), pages 163-180, July.
    3. Yan, Haomin, 2021. "Position auctions with multi-unit demands," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 179-193.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions

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