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Mistaken Play in the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm: Implications for Positive Assortative Matching

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  • Alex Rees-Jones

Abstract

Recent literature has documented failures of truthful preference reporting in the strategy-proof deferred acceptance algorithm. I consider the implications of these strategic mistakes for a common welfare consideration: the ability of the mechanism to sort the best students to the best schools. I find that these mistakes have the potential to significantly help or significantly hinder sorting. Through this channel, the presence of mistaken play may have widely varying welfare effects. I discuss related considerations in the welfare evaluation of mistaken play in the deferred acceptance algorithm and the implications for "nudges" that correct these mistakes.

Suggested Citation

  • Alex Rees-Jones, 2017. "Mistaken Play in the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm: Implications for Positive Assortative Matching," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(5), pages 225-229, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:107:y:2017:i:5:p:225-29
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.p20171028
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Ran I. Shorrer & Sandor Sovago, 2017. "Obvious Mistakes in a Strategically Simple College Admissions Environment," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 17-107/V, Tinbergen Institute.
    2. Basteck, Christian & Mantovani, Marco, 2018. "Cognitive ability and games of school choice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 156-183.
    3. Rees-Jones, Alex, 2018. "Suboptimal behavior in strategy-proof mechanisms: Evidence from the residency match," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 317-330.
    4. Yoan Hermstrüwer, 2019. "Transparency and Fairness in School Choice Mechanisms," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2019_11, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    5. Alex Rees-Jones & Ran Shorrer & Chloe J. Tergiman, 2020. "Correlation Neglect in Student-to-School Matching," NBER Working Papers 26734, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Echenique, Federico & Miyashita, Masaki & Nakamura, Yuta & Pomatto, Luciano & Vinson, Jamie, 2022. "Twofold multiprior preferences and failures of contingent reasoning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 202(C).
    7. Nicolas L. Bottan & Ricardo Perez-Truglia, 2022. "Choosing Your Pond: Location Choices and Relative Income," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 104(5), pages 1010-1027, December.
    8. Marek Pycia & Peter Troyan, 2021. "A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design," ECON - Working Papers 393, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D12 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education

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