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Takashi Kunimoto

Personal Details

First Name:Takashi
Middle Name:
Last Name:Kunimoto
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pku105
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
https://sites.google.com/site/tkunimoto73/
Terminal Degree:2005 Economics Department; Brown University (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

School of Economics
Singapore Management University

Singapore, Singapore
http://www.economics.smu.edu.sg/
RePEc:edi:sesmusg (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Chatterji, Shurojit & Kunimoto, Takashi & Ramos, Paulo, 2022. "Compellingness in Nash Implementation," Economics and Statistics Working Papers 10-2022, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
  2. Kunimoto, Takashi & Zhang, Cuiling, 2021. "Efficient Bilateral Trade via Two-Stage Mechanisms under One- Sided Asymmetric Information," Economics and Statistics Working Papers 8-2021, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
  3. Yi-Chun Chen & Takashi Kunimoto & Yifei Sun & Siyang Xiong, 2021. "Maskin Meets Abreu and Matsushima," Papers 2110.06551, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2022.
  4. Chen, Yi-Chun & Kunimoto, Takashi & Sun, Yifei & Xiong, Siyang, 2020. "Rationalizable Implementation in Finite Mechanisms," Economics and Statistics Working Papers 5-2020, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
  5. Takashi Kunimoto & Rene Saran & Roberto Serrano, 2020. "Interim Rationalizable Implementation of Functions," Working Papers 2020-23, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  6. Kunimoto, Takashi & Saran, Rene, 2020. "Robust Implementation in Rationalizable Strategies in General Mechanisms," Economics and Statistics Working Papers 10-2020, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
  7. Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2020. "Rationalizable Incentives: Interim Implementation of Sets in Rationalizable Strategies," Working Papers 2020-15, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  8. Kunimoto, Takashi & Zhang, Cuiling, 2020. "Efficient Bilateral Trade with Interdependent Values: The Use of Two-Stage Mechanisms," Economics and Statistics Working Papers 14-2020, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
  9. Chen, Yi-Chun & Kunimoto, Takashi & Sun, Yifei, 2019. "Continuous Implementation with Small Transfers," Economics and Statistics Working Papers 19-2019, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
  10. Kunimoto, Takashi & Yamashita, Takuro, 2018. "Order on Types based on Monotone Comparative Statics," TSE Working Papers 18-942, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  11. Kunimoto, Takashi & Zhang, Cuiling, 2018. "On Incentive Compatible, Individually Rational Public Good Provision Mechanisms," Economics and Statistics Working Papers 21-2018, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
  12. Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2016. "Rationalizable Implementation of Correspondences," Working Papers 2016-4, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  13. Chen, Yi-Chun & Kunimoto, Takashi & 国本, 隆 & Sun, Yifei, 2015. "Implementation with Transfers," Discussion Papers 2015-04, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
  14. Philippe Aghion & Drew Fudenberg & Richard Holden & Takashi Kunimoto & Olivier Tercieux, 2012. "Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations," Post-Print hal-00812781, HAL.
  15. Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2010. "Evaluating the Conditions for Robust Mechanism Design Abstract: We assess the strength of the different conditions identified in the literature of robust mechanism design. We focus on three conditions," Working Papers 2010-6, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  16. Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2010. "Evaluating the conditions for robust mechanism design," Working Papers 2010-05, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
  17. Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2010. "A New Necessary Condition for Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies," Working Papers 2010-2, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  18. Georgy Artemov & Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Robust Virtual Implementation with Incomplete Information: Toward a Reinterpretation of the Wilson Doctrine," Working Papers 2007-6, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  19. Takashi Kunimoto, 2006. "The Robustness Of Equilibrium Analysis: The Case Of Undominated Nash Equilibrium," Departmental Working Papers 2006-26, McGill University, Department of Economics.
  20. Takashi Kunimoto, 2006. "On The Non-Robustness Of Nash Implementation," Departmental Working Papers 2006-25, McGill University, Department of Economics.
  21. Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2002. "Bargaining and Competition Revisited," Working Papers 2002-14, Brown University, Department of Economics.

    repec:hal:pseose:hal-00812781 is not listed on IDEAS

Articles

  1. Yi-Chun Chen & Richard Holden & Takashi Kunimoto & Yifei Sun & Tom Wilkening, 2023. "Getting Dynamic Implementation to Work," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 131(2), pages 285-387.
  2. Chen, Yi-Chun & Kunimoto, Takashi & Sun, Yifei, 2023. "Continuous implementation with payoff knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 209(C).
  3. Chen, Yi-Chun & Kunimoto, Takashi & Sun, Yifei & Xiong, Siyang, 2022. "Maskin meets Abreu and Matsushima," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(4), November.
  4. Kunimoto, Takashi & Zhang, Cuiling, 2022. "Efficient bilateral trade via two-stage mechanisms: Comparison between one-sided and two-sided asymmetric information environments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(C).
  5. Chen, Yi-Chun & Kunimoto, Takashi & Sun, Yifei & Xiong, Siyang, 2021. "Rationalizable implementation in finite mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 181-197.
  6. Takashi Kunimoto & Cuiling Zhang, 2021. "On incentive compatible, individually rational public good provision mechanisms," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 57(2), pages 431-468, August.
  7. Kunimoto, Takashi & Yamashita, Takuro, 2020. "Order on types based on monotone comparative statics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 189(C).
  8. Kunimoto, Takashi, 2020. "Robust virtual implementation with almost complete information," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 62-73.
  9. Kunimoto, Takashi, 2019. "Mixed Bayesian implementation in general environments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 247-263.
  10. Artemov, Georgy & Kunimoto, Takashi & Serrano, Roberto, 2013. "Robust virtual implementation: Toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(2), pages 424-447.
  11. Philippe Aghion & Drew Fudenberg & Richard Holden & Takashi Kunimoto & Olivier Tercieux, 2012. "Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 127(4), pages 1843-1881.
  12. Kunimoto, Takashi & Serrano, Roberto, 2011. "A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(6), pages 2583-2595.
  13. Takashi Kunimoto, 2010. "Indescribability and its irrelevance for contractual incompleteness," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 14(3), pages 271-289, September.
  14. Kunimoto, Takashi, 2008. "Indescribability and asymmetric information at the contracting stage," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(2), pages 367-370, May.
  15. Kunimoto, Takashi & Serrano, Roberto, 2004. "Bargaining and competition revisited," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 115(1), pages 78-88, March.

    RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:44:y:2019:i:4:p:1326-1344 is not listed on IDEAS

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Yi-Chun Chen & Takashi Kunimoto & Yifei Sun & Siyang Xiong, 2021. "Maskin Meets Abreu and Matsushima," Papers 2110.06551, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2022.

    Cited by:

    1. Ritesh Jain, 2019. "Rationalizable Implementation of Social Choice Correspondences," IEAS Working Paper : academic research 19-A002, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan.
    2. Kunimoto, Takashi & Saran, Rene & Serrano, Roberto, 2020. "Interim Rationalizable Implementation of Functions," Economics and Statistics Working Papers 21-2020, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
    3. Soumen Banerjee & Yi-Chun Chen, 2022. "Implementation with Uncertain Evidence," Papers 2209.10741, arXiv.org.
    4. Siyang Xiong, 2022. "Nash implementation by stochastic mechanisms: a simple full characterization," Papers 2211.05431, arXiv.org.
    5. Federico Echenique & Mat'ias N'u~nez, 2022. "Price & Choose," Papers 2212.05650, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2023.

  2. Chen, Yi-Chun & Kunimoto, Takashi & Sun, Yifei & Xiong, Siyang, 2020. "Rationalizable Implementation in Finite Mechanisms," Economics and Statistics Working Papers 5-2020, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Chen, Yi-Chun & Kunimoto, Takashi & Sun, Yifei, 2023. "Continuous implementation with payoff knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 209(C).
    2. Ritesh Jain & Ville Korpela & Michele Lombardi, 2022. "An Iterative Approach to Rationalizable Implementation," CSEF Working Papers 640, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    3. R. Jain & V. Korpela & M. Lombardi, 2023. "Two-Player Rationalizable Implementation," Working Papers 202317, University of Liverpool, Department of Economics.
    4. Ritesh Jain, 2019. "Rationalizable Implementation of Social Choice Correspondences," IEAS Working Paper : academic research 19-A002, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan.
    5. Kunimoto, Takashi & Saran, Rene & Serrano, Roberto, 2020. "Interim Rationalizable Implementation of Functions," Economics and Statistics Working Papers 21-2020, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
    6. Siyang Xiong, 2022. "Rationalizable Implementation of Social Choice Functions: Complete Characterization," Papers 2202.04885, arXiv.org.
    7. Banerjee, Soumen & Chen, Yi-Chun & Sun, Yifei, 2024. "Direct implementation with evidence," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(2), May.
    8. Barlo, Mehmet & Dalkıran, Nuh Aygün, 2023. "Behavioral implementation under incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).

  3. Takashi Kunimoto & Rene Saran & Roberto Serrano, 2020. "Interim Rationalizable Implementation of Functions," Working Papers 2020-23, Brown University, Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Chen, Yi-Chun & Kunimoto, Takashi & Sun, Yifei, 2023. "Continuous implementation with payoff knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 209(C).
    2. Giacomo Rubbini, 2023. "Mechanism Design without Rational Expectations," Papers 2305.07472, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2023.
    3. Ritesh Jain & Michele Lombardi, 2023. "On Interim Rationalizable Monotonicity," Working Papers 202315, University of Liverpool, Department of Economics.
    4. R Jain & M Lombardi, 2022. "Interim Rationalizable (and Bayes-Nash) Implementation of Functions: A full Characterization," IEAS Working Paper : academic research 22-A001, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan.

  4. Kunimoto, Takashi & Saran, Rene, 2020. "Robust Implementation in Rationalizable Strategies in General Mechanisms," Economics and Statistics Working Papers 10-2020, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Jain, Ritesh & Lombardi, Michele & Müller, Christoph, 2023. "An alternative equivalent formulation for robust implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 368-380.
    2. Kunimoto, Takashi & Saran, Rene & Serrano, Roberto, 2020. "Interim Rationalizable Implementation of Functions," Economics and Statistics Working Papers 21-2020, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
    3. Ritesh Jain & Michele Lombardi, 2023. "On Interim Rationalizable Monotonicity," Working Papers 202315, University of Liverpool, Department of Economics.

  5. Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2020. "Rationalizable Incentives: Interim Implementation of Sets in Rationalizable Strategies," Working Papers 2020-15, Brown University, Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Barlo, Mehmet & Dalkıran, Nuh Aygün, 2023. "Behavioral implementation under incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).

  6. Kunimoto, Takashi & Zhang, Cuiling, 2020. "Efficient Bilateral Trade with Interdependent Values: The Use of Two-Stage Mechanisms," Economics and Statistics Working Papers 14-2020, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Bharadwaj Satchidanandan & Munther A. Dahleh, 2022. "Incentive Compatibility in Two-Stage Repeated Stochastic Games," Papers 2203.10206, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2022.

  7. Chen, Yi-Chun & Kunimoto, Takashi & Sun, Yifei, 2019. "Continuous Implementation with Small Transfers," Economics and Statistics Working Papers 19-2019, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Victor H. Aguiar & Per Hjertstrand & Roberto Serrano, 2020. "Rationalizable Incentives: Interim Implementation of Sets in Rationalizable Strategies," Working Papers 2020-16, Brown University, Department of Economics.

  8. Kunimoto, Takashi & Zhang, Cuiling, 2018. "On Incentive Compatible, Individually Rational Public Good Provision Mechanisms," Economics and Statistics Working Papers 21-2018, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Jin Xi & Haitian Xie, 2023. "Strength in numbers: robust mechanisms for public goods with many agents," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 61(3), pages 649-683, October.

  9. Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2016. "Rationalizable Implementation of Correspondences," Working Papers 2016-4, Brown University, Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Ritesh Jain, 2019. "Rationalizable Implementation of Social Choice Correspondences," IEAS Working Paper : academic research 19-A002, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan.
    2. Ritesh Jain & Michele Lombardi, 2019. "Virtual implementation by bounded mechanisms: Complete information," IEAS Working Paper : academic research 19-A001, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan.
    3. Victor H. Aguiar & Per Hjertstrand & Roberto Serrano, 2020. "Rationalizable Incentives: Interim Implementation of Sets in Rationalizable Strategies," Working Papers 2020-16, Brown University, Department of Economics.

  10. Chen, Yi-Chun & Kunimoto, Takashi & 国本, 隆 & Sun, Yifei, 2015. "Implementation with Transfers," Discussion Papers 2015-04, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.

    Cited by:

    1. Philippe Aghion & Drew Fudenberg & Richard T. Holden, 2009. "Subgame Perfect Implementation with Almost Perfect Information and the Hold-Up Problem," NBER Working Papers 15167, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Mikhail Safronov, 2016. "A Coasian Approach to Efficient Mechanism Design," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1619, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    3. Philippe Aghion & Drew Fudenberg & Richard Holden & Takashi Kunimoto & Olivier Tercieux, 2012. "Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 127(4), pages 1843-1881.
    4. Chen, Yi-Chun & Sun, Yifei, 2015. "Full implementation in backward induction," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 71-76.
    5. Oury, Marion, 2015. "Continuous implementation with local payoff uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 656-677.
    6. Safronov, Mikhail, 2018. "Coalition-proof full efficient implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 659-677.

  11. Philippe Aghion & Drew Fudenberg & Richard Holden & Takashi Kunimoto & Olivier Tercieux, 2012. "Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations," Post-Print hal-00812781, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Matthias Lang, 2014. "Communicating Subjective Evaluations," CESifo Working Paper Series 4830, CESifo.
    2. Oliver Hart, 2013. "Noncontractible Investments and Reference Points," Games, MDPI, vol. 4(3), pages 1-20, August.
    3. Marin, Dalia & Doerr, Sebastian & Suverato, Davide & Verdier, Thierry, 2020. "Mis-allocation Within Firms: Internal Finance and International Trade," CEPR Discussion Papers 14478, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Ortner, Juan, 2015. "Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 1-16.
    5. n/a, 2012. "Commentaries and Reply to "Can Brand Extension Signal Product Quality?" by Sridhar Moorthy," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 31(5), pages 771-778, September.
    6. Navin Kartik & Olivier Tercieux, 2012. "Implementation with Evidence," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-00754592, HAL.
    7. Xianyi Wang & Xiaofang Wang & Hui He, 2021. "Contracts to Coordinate Healthcare Providers in the Telemedicine Referral System," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(18), pages 1-25, September.
    8. Harry Pei & Bruno Strulovici, 2021. "Robust Implementation with Costly Information," Papers 2112.06032, arXiv.org.
    9. Iossa, Elisabetta & Che, Yeon-Koo & Rey, Patrick, 2017. "Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation," CEPR Discussion Papers 11904, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Chen, Yi-Chun & Kunimoto, Takashi & Sun, Yifei & Xiong, Siyang, 2022. "Maskin meets Abreu and Matsushima," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(4), November.
    11. Hayashi, Takashi & Lombardi, Michele, 2019. "One-step-ahead implementation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 110-126.
    12. Goldlücke, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2014. "Investments as signals of outside options," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 683-708.
    13. Chen, Yi-Chun & Mueller-Frank, Manuel & Pai, Mallesh M., 2022. "Continuous implementation with direct revelation mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).
    14. Bester, Helmut & Krähmer, Daniel, 2008. "Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information," Discussion Papers 2008/23, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
    15. Berde, Éva, 2013. "A fundamentális transzformáció és a referenciapont szerepe a hiányos szerződések elméletében [The role of basic transformation and reference point in the theory of incomplete contracts]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(7), pages 865-885.
    16. Jason Roderick Donaldson & Denis Gromb & Giorgia Piacentino, 2017. "The Paradox of Pledgeability," Working Papers hal-01970749, HAL.
    17. Satoru Takahashi & Olivier Tercieux, 2020. "Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs," Post-Print halshs-02875199, HAL.
    18. Yi-Chun Chen & Richard Holden & Takashi Kunimoto & Yifei Sun & Tom Wilkening, 2023. "Getting Dynamic Implementation to Work," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 131(2), pages 285-387.
    19. Joshua S. Gans, 2019. "The Fine Print in Smart Contracts," NBER Working Papers 25443, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    20. Navin Kartik & Olivier Tercieux & Richard Holden, 2014. "Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty," Post-Print halshs-00943301, HAL.
    21. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Hoppe-Fischer, Eva, 2015. "Hidden Action and Outcome Contractibility: An Experimental Test of Contract Theory," CEPR Discussion Papers 11002, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    22. Schmidt, Klaus, 2017. "The 2016 Nobel Memorial Prize in Contract Theory," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 19, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    23. Jain, Ritesh & Lombardi, Michele, 2022. "Continuous virtual implementation: Complete information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(C).
    24. Philippe Aghion & Richard Holden, 2011. "Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm: What Have We Learned over the Past 25 Years?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 25(2), pages 181-197, Spring.
    25. Fehr, Ernst & Powell, Michael & Wilkening, Tom, 2014. "Handing Out Guns at a Knife Fight: Behavioral Limitations of Subgame-Perfect Implementation," IZA Discussion Papers 8404, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    26. Kim, Minseong, 2019. "Firms as problem solvers: economics meets computer science," MPRA Paper 97332, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    27. Thomas F. Hellmann & Veikko Thiele, 2012. "A Theory of the Firm based on Partner Displacement," NBER Working Papers 18495, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    28. Committee, Nobel Prize, 2016. "Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström: Contract Theory," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2016-1, Nobel Prize Committee.
    29. Eccles, Peter & Wegner, Nora, 2016. "Robustness of subgame perfect implementation," Bank of England working papers 601, Bank of England.
    30. Ernst Fehr & Michael Powell & Tom Wilkening, 2021. "Behavioral Constraints on the Design of Subgame-Perfect Implementation Mechanisms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(4), pages 1055-1091, April.
    31. Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2018. "Hidden action and outcome contractibility: An experimental test of moral hazard theory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 544-564.
    32. Ohlendorf, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick, 2009. "Signaling an Outside Option," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 281, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    33. Geoffroy de Clippel & Rene Saran & Roberto Serrano, 2021. "Continuous Level-k Mechanism Design," Working Papers 2021-002, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    34. Eduard Marinov, 2016. "The 2016 Nobel Prize in Economics," Economic Thought journal, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute, issue 6, pages 97-149.
    35. Chen, Yi-Chun & Takahashi, Satoru & Xiong, Siyang, 2022. "Robust refinement of rationalizability with arbitrary payoff uncertainty," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 485-504.
    36. Guembel, Alexander & White, Lucy, 2014. "Good cop, bad cop: Complementarities between debt and equity in disciplining management," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 541-569.
    37. Mariann Ollar & Antonio Penta, 2019. "Implementation via Transfers with Identical but Unknown Distributions," Working Papers 1126, Barcelona School of Economics.
    38. Tomoeda, Kentaro, 2019. "Efficient investments in the implementation problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 182(C), pages 247-278.
    39. de Clippel, Geoffroy & Saran, Rene & Serrano, Roberto, 2023. "Continuous level-k mechanism design," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 481-501.
    40. Chen, Yi-Chun & Sun, Yifei, 2015. "Full implementation in backward induction," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 71-76.
    41. Kunimoto, Takashi, 2020. "Robust virtual implementation with almost complete information," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 62-73.
    42. Geoffroy de Clippel & Rene Saran & Roberto Serrano, 2014. "Mechanism Design with Bounded Depth of Reasoning and Small Modeling Mistakes," Working Papers 2014-7, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    43. Carroll, Gabriel & Meng, Delong, 2016. "Locally robust contracts for moral hazard," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 36-51.
    44. Banerjee, Soumen & Chen, Yi-Chun & Sun, Yifei, 2024. "Direct implementation with evidence," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(2), May.
    45. Mezzetti, Claudio & Renou, Ludovic, 2017. "Repeated Nash implementation," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(1), January.
    46. Kyungmin Kim & Antonio Penta, 2012. "A Robustly Efficient Auction," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 248, Collegio Carlo Alberto.

  12. Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2010. "Evaluating the conditions for robust mechanism design," Working Papers 2010-05, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.

    Cited by:

    1. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2011. "Robust Mechanism Design: An Introduction," Working Papers 1332, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
    2. Kunimoto, Takashi & Serrano, Roberto, 2011. "A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(6), pages 2583-2595.

  13. Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2010. "A New Necessary Condition for Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies," Working Papers 2010-2, Brown University, Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Ritesh Jain, 2019. "Rationalizable Implementation of Social Choice Correspondences," IEAS Working Paper : academic research 19-A002, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan.
    2. Ritesh Jain & Michele Lombardi, 2019. "Virtual implementation by bounded mechanisms: Complete information," IEAS Working Paper : academic research 19-A001, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan.
    3. Artemov, Georgy, 2015. "Time and Nash implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 229-236.
    4. Jain, Ritesh & Lombardi, Michele, 2022. "Continuous virtual implementation: Complete information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(C).
    5. Hsieh, Yue-Da & Qian, Xuewen & Qu, Chen, 2023. "Iterated bounded dominance," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 232(C).
    6. Yi-Chun Chen & Xiao Luo & Chen Qu, 2016. "Rationalizability in general situations," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 61(1), pages 147-167, January.
    7. Kunimoto, Takashi, 2020. "Robust virtual implementation with almost complete information," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 62-73.
    8. Artemov, Georgy & Kunimoto, Takashi & Serrano, Roberto, 2013. "Robust virtual implementation: Toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(2), pages 424-447.

  14. Georgy Artemov & Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Robust Virtual Implementation with Incomplete Information: Toward a Reinterpretation of the Wilson Doctrine," Working Papers 2007-6, Brown University, Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2009. "Rationalizable Implementation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1697, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    2. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2011. "Robust Mechanism Design: An Introduction," Working Papers 1332, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
    3. Makoto Shimoji & Paul Schweinzer, 2012. "Implementation without Incentive Compatibility: Two Stories with Partially Informed Planners," Discussion Papers 12/21, Department of Economics, University of York.
    4. Kunimoto, Takashi & Serrano, Roberto, 2011. "A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(6), pages 2583-2595.
    5. Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2010. "Evaluating the Conditions for Robust Mechanism Design Abstract: We assess the strength of the different conditions identified in the literature of robust mechanism design. We focus on three conditions," Working Papers 2010-6, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    6. Corchón, Luis C., 2008. "The theory of implementation : what did we learn?," UC3M Working papers. Economics we081207, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    7. Mariann Ollár & Antonio Penta, 2021. "A Network Solution to Robust Implementation: The Case of Identical but Unknown Distributions," Working Papers 1248, Barcelona School of Economics.
    8. Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2009. "Multiplicity of Mixed Equilibria in Mechanisms: A Unified Approach to Exact and Approximate Implementation," Working Papers wp2009_0908, CEMFI.
    9. Di Tillio, Alfredo, 2011. "A robustness result for rationalizable implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 301-305, May.
    10. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2009. "Robust Virtual Implementation," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000155, David K. Levine.
    11. Chen, Jing & Micali, Silvio, 2015. "Mechanism design with possibilistic beliefs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 77-102.
    12. Mariann Ollar & Antonio Penta, 2019. "Implementation via Transfers with Identical but Unknown Distributions," Working Papers 1126, Barcelona School of Economics.
    13. Kyungmin Kim & Antonio Penta, 2012. "A Robustly Efficient Auction," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 248, Collegio Carlo Alberto.

  15. Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2002. "Bargaining and Competition Revisited," Working Papers 2002-14, Brown University, Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Antoine Mandel & Herbert Gintis, 2016. "Decentralized Pricing and the equivalence between Nash and Walrasian equilibrium," Post-Print halshs-01296646, HAL.
    2. Christian Korth & Stefan Napel, 2009. "Fairness, Price Stickiness, and History Dependence in Decentralized Trade," Post-Print hal-00682404, HAL.
    3. DAVILA, Julio & EECKHOUT, Jan, 2009. "Competitive bargaining equilibrium," LIDAM Reprints CORE 2069, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    4. Régis Breton, 2006. "Robustness of equilibrium price dispersion in finite market games," Post-Print halshs-00256847, HAL.
    5. Flåm, S.D. & Godal, O., 2008. "Market clearing and price formation," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 956-977, March.
    6. Manea, Mihai, 2017. "Bargaining in dynamic markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 59-77.
    7. Olivier Bochet, 2007. "Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence: the boundary problem," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 36(2), pages 301-316, October.
    8. Penta, Antonio, 2007. "Collective Bargaining and Walrasian Equilibrium," MPRA Paper 10260, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Sep 2007.
    9. Lauermann, Stephan, 2011. "Dynamic matching and bargaining games: A general approach," MPRA Paper 31717, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Franco DONZELLI, 2011. "The law of indifference, equilibrium, and equilibration in Jevons, Walras, Edgeworth, and Negishi," Departmental Working Papers 2011-11, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
    11. Penta, Antonio, 2011. "Multilateral bargaining and Walrasian equilibrium," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(4-5), pages 417-424.
    12. Marakulin Valery, 2006. "On convergence of contractual trajectories in pure exchange economies," EERC Working Paper Series 06-07e, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS.

Articles

  1. Chen, Yi-Chun & Kunimoto, Takashi & Sun, Yifei & Xiong, Siyang, 2022. "Maskin meets Abreu and Matsushima," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(4), November.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Chen, Yi-Chun & Kunimoto, Takashi & Sun, Yifei & Xiong, Siyang, 2021. "Rationalizable implementation in finite mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 181-197.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  3. Takashi Kunimoto & Cuiling Zhang, 2021. "On incentive compatible, individually rational public good provision mechanisms," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 57(2), pages 431-468, August.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  4. Kunimoto, Takashi, 2019. "Mixed Bayesian implementation in general environments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 247-263.

    Cited by:

    1. Kunimoto, Takashi & Saran, Rene & Serrano, Roberto, 2020. "Interim Rationalizable Implementation of Functions," Economics and Statistics Working Papers 21-2020, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
    2. Chen, Yi-Chun & Kunimoto, Takashi & Sun, Yifei & Xiong, Siyang, 2022. "Maskin meets Abreu and Matsushima," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(4), November.
    3. Victor H. Aguiar & Per Hjertstrand & Roberto Serrano, 2020. "Rationalizable Incentives: Interim Implementation of Sets in Rationalizable Strategies," Working Papers 2020-16, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    4. Ritesh Jain & Michele Lombardi, 2023. "On Interim Rationalizable Monotonicity," Working Papers 202315, University of Liverpool, Department of Economics.

  5. Artemov, Georgy & Kunimoto, Takashi & Serrano, Roberto, 2013. "Robust virtual implementation: Toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(2), pages 424-447.

    Cited by:

    1. Makoto Shimoji & Paul Schweinzer, 2012. "Implementation without Incentive Compatibility: Two Stories with Partially Informed Planners," Discussion Papers 12/21, Department of Economics, University of York.
    2. Chen, Yi-Chun & Kunimoto, Takashi & Sun, Yifei, 2023. "Continuous implementation with payoff knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 209(C).
    3. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Pietro Tebaldi, 2019. "Interactive epistemology in simple dynamic games with a continuum of strategies," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 68(3), pages 737-763, October.
    4. Marcus Pivato, 2016. "Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rule," Post-Print hal-02980107, HAL.
    5. Müller, Christoph, 2020. "Robust implementation in weakly perfect Bayesian strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 189(C).
    6. Kunimoto, Takashi & Saran, Rene & Serrano, Roberto, 2020. "Interim Rationalizable Implementation of Functions," Economics and Statistics Working Papers 21-2020, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
    7. Marcus Pivato, 2016. "Statistical utilitarianism," Post-Print hal-02980108, HAL.
    8. Giacomo Rubbini, 2023. "Mechanism Design without Rational Expectations," Papers 2305.07472, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2023.
    9. Núñez, Matías & Pivato, Marcus, 2019. "Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 285-305.
    10. Modibo Camara & Jason Hartline & Aleck Johnsen, 2020. "Mechanisms for a No-Regret Agent: Beyond the Common Prior," Papers 2009.05518, arXiv.org.
    11. Ziegler, Gabriel, 2022. "Informational robustness of common belief in rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 592-597.
    12. Geoffroy de Clippel & Rene Saran & Roberto Serrano, 2021. "Continuous Level-k Mechanism Design," Working Papers 2021-002, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    13. Chen, Yi-Chun & Kunimoto, Takashi & 国本, 隆 & Sun, Yifei, 2015. "Implementation with Transfers," Discussion Papers 2015-04, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
    14. de Clippel, Geoffroy & Saran, Rene & Serrano, Roberto, 2023. "Continuous level-k mechanism design," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 481-501.
    15. Müller, Christoph, 2016. "Robust virtual implementation under common strong belief in rationality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 407-450.
    16. Kunimoto, Takashi, 2020. "Robust virtual implementation with almost complete information," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 62-73.
    17. Geoffroy de Clippel & Rene Saran & Roberto Serrano, 2014. "Mechanism Design with Bounded Depth of Reasoning and Small Modeling Mistakes," Working Papers 2014-7, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    18. Oury, Marion, 2015. "Continuous implementation with local payoff uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 656-677.

  6. Philippe Aghion & Drew Fudenberg & Richard Holden & Takashi Kunimoto & Olivier Tercieux, 2012. "Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 127(4), pages 1843-1881.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  7. Kunimoto, Takashi & Serrano, Roberto, 2011. "A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(6), pages 2583-2595.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  8. Takashi Kunimoto, 2010. "Indescribability and its irrelevance for contractual incompleteness," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 14(3), pages 271-289, September.

    Cited by:

    1. Kunimoto, Takashi, 2008. "Indescribability and asymmetric information at the contracting stage," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(2), pages 367-370, May.

  9. Kunimoto, Takashi & Serrano, Roberto, 2004. "Bargaining and competition revisited," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 115(1), pages 78-88, March.
    See citations under working paper version above.

More information

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 20 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (15) 2006-09-30 2007-06-23 2007-07-27 2010-01-30 2010-04-11 2010-05-08 2015-04-25 2018-08-27 2018-12-10 2020-05-11 2020-06-15 2020-12-14 2021-09-13 2021-10-18 2022-12-12. Author is listed
  2. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (15) 2010-05-08 2015-04-25 2016-06-25 2018-08-27 2018-12-10 2019-11-18 2020-03-02 2020-03-02 2020-05-11 2020-06-15 2020-11-16 2020-12-14 2021-09-13 2021-10-18 2022-12-12. Author is listed
  3. NEP-DES: Economic Design (9) 2018-12-10 2019-11-18 2020-05-11 2020-06-15 2020-11-16 2020-12-14 2021-09-13 2021-10-18 2022-12-12. Author is listed
  4. NEP-SEA: South East Asia (9) 2018-12-10 2019-11-18 2020-03-02 2020-03-02 2020-05-11 2020-06-15 2020-11-16 2021-09-13 2022-12-12. Author is listed
  5. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (1) 2010-04-11
  6. NEP-GEN: Gender (1) 2020-05-11
  7. NEP-ISF: Islamic Finance (1) 2021-09-13
  8. NEP-NET: Network Economics (1) 2016-06-25

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