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Auction design without quasilinear preferences

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Yu Zhou & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2020. "Serial Vickrey Mechanism," ISER Discussion Paper 1095, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  2. Tomoya Kazumura & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2016. "Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(3), pages 633-663, October.
  3. Bichler, Martin & Merting, Sören, 2018. "Truthfulness in advertising? Approximation mechanisms for knapsack bidders," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 270(2), pages 775-783.
  4. , & ,, 2015. "Strategy-proofness and efficiency with non-quasi-linear preferences: a characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(2), May.
  5. SHINOZAKI, Hiroki, 2023. "Non-obvious manipulability and efficiency in package assignment problems with money for agents with income effects and hard budget constraints," Discussion paper series HIAS-E-136, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University.
  6. Yu Zhou & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2019. "Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment market," ISER Discussion Paper 1047, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  7. Piotr Dworczak & Scott Duke Kominers & Mohammad Akbarpour, 2021. "Redistribution Through Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(4), pages 1665-1698, July.
  8. Zhang, Mengxi, 2024. "Optimal contests with incomplete information and convex effort costs," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(1), January.
  9. Muhammad Ejaz & Nisho Rani & Muhammad Ramzan Sheikh, 2023. "First Price Sealed-Bid Auctions with Bidders’ Heterogeneous Risk Behavior: An Adversarial Risk Analysis Approach," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 20(3), pages 231-241, September.
  10. Tomer Siedner, 2019. "Optimal pricing by a risk-averse seller," Discussion Paper Series dp725, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  11. Komal Malik & Debasis Mishra, 2018. "Pareto efficient combinatorial auctions: dichotomous preferences without quasilinearity," Discussion Papers 18-06, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.
  12. Baisa, Brian, 2020. "Efficient multi-unit auctions for normal goods," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(1), January.
  13. Kazumura, Tomoya & Mishra, Debasis & Serizawa, Shigehiro, 2020. "Mechanism design without quasilinearity," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(2), May.
  14. Tomoya Kazumura & Debasis Mishra & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2017. "Strategy-proof multi-object auction design: Ex-post revenue maximization with no wastage," Discussion Papers 17-03, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.
  15. Tomoya Kazumura & Debasis Mishra & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2017. "Strategy-proof multi-object allocation: Ex-post revenue maximization with no wastage," Working Papers e116, Tokyo Center for Economic Research.
  16. Andersson, Tommy & Svensson, Lars-Gunnar, 2018. "Sequential rules for house allocation with price restrictions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 41-59.
  17. Muhammad Ejaz & Stephen Joe & Chaitanya Joshi, 2021. "Adversarial Risk Analysis for Auctions Using Mirror Equilibrium and Bayes Nash Equilibrium," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 18(3), pages 185-202, September.
  18. Katharina Huesmann & Achim Wambach, 2015. "Constraints on Matching Markets Based on Moral Concerns," CESifo Working Paper Series 5356, CESifo.
  19. Hu, Audrey & Matthews, Steven A. & Zou, Liang, 2018. "English auctions with ensuing risks and heterogeneous bidders," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 33-44.
  20. Yu Zhou & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2016. "Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency for Non-quasi-linear Common-Tiered-Object Preferences: Characterization of Minimum Price Rule," ISER Discussion Paper 0971, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  21. Tomoya Kazumura & Debasis Mishra & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2017. "Strategy-proof multi-object auction design: Ex-post revenue maximization with no wastage," ISER Discussion Paper 1001, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  22. Baisa, Brian, 2016. "Overbidding and inefficiencies in multi-unit Vickrey auctions for normal goods," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 23-35.
  23. Mengxi Zhang, 2023. "Optimal Contests with Incomplete Information and Convex Effort Costs," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2023_156v2, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
  24. Saeed Alaei & Kamal Jain & Azarakhsh Malekian, 2016. "Competitive Equilibria in Two-Sided Matching Markets with General Utility Functions," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 64(3), pages 638-645, June.
  25. Richter, Michael, 2019. "Mechanism design with budget constraints and a population of agents," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 30-47.
  26. Vasserman, Shoshana & Watt, Mitchell, 2021. "Risk aversion and auction design: Theoretical and empirical evidence," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
  27. Kazumura, Tomoya & Mishra, Debasis & Serizawa, Shigehiro, 2020. "Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
  28. Zhou, Yu & Serizawa, Shigehiro, 2018. "Strategy-proofness and efficiency for non-quasi-linear and common-tiered-object preferences: Characterization of minimum price rule," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 327-363.
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