The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring

Citations

Cited by:

1. Hörner, Johannes & Takahashi, Satoru & Vieille, Nicolas, 2014. "On the limit perfect public equilibrium payoff set in repeated and stochastic games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 70-83.
2. Seok-ju Cho & John Duggan, 2015. "A folk theorem for the one-dimensional spatial bargaining model," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(4), pages 933-948, November.
3. , & ,, 2015. "A folk theorem for stochastic games with infrequent state changes," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(1), January.
4. Barlo, Mehmet & Urgun, Can, 2011. "Stochastic discounting in repeated games: Awaiting the almost inevitable," MPRA Paper 28537, University Library of Munich, Germany.
5. Renault, Jérôme & Ziliotto, Bruno, 2020. "Hidden stochastic games and limit equilibrium payoffs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 122-139.
   • Renault, Jérôme & Ziliotto, Bruno, 2017. "Hidden Stochastic Games and Limit Equilibrium Payoffs," TSE Working Papers 17-750, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
6. Barron, Daniel, 2017. "Attaining efficiency with imperfect public monitoring and one-sided Markov adverse selection," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(3), September.
7. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2014. "We Can Cooperate Even When the Monitoring Structure Will Never Be Known," PIER Working Paper Archive 17-011, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 08 Apr 2017.
8. Sebastian Kranz, 2013. "Relational Contracting, Repeated Negotiations, and Hold-Up," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000676, David K. Levine.
   • Kranz, Sebastian, 2013. "Relational Contracting, Repeated Negotiations, and Hold-Up," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 80047, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
   • Sebastian Kranz, 2013. "Relational Contracting, Repeated Negotiations, and Hold-Up," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1888, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
9. Rumen Kostadinov, 2023. "Worst-case Regret in Ambiguous Dynamic Games," Department of Economics Working Papers 2022-08, McMaster University.
10. Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Meshalkin, Andrey & Predtetchinski, Arkadi, 2017. "A one-period memory folk theorem for multilateral bargaining games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 185-198.
11. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2014. "Stochastic Games with Hidden States, Fifth version," PIER Working Paper Archive 18-028, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 19 May 2018.
12. Can, Burak, 2014. "Weighted distances between preferences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 109-115.
    • Can, B., 2012. "Weighted distances between preferences," Research Memorandum 056, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
13. Richter, Michael, 2014. "Fully absorbing dynamic compromise," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 92-104.
14. Susanne Goldlücke & Sebastian Kranz, 2018. "Discounted stochastic games with voluntary transfers," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 66(1), pages 235-263, July.
    • Sebastian Kranz, 2012. "Discounted Stochastic Games with Voluntary Transfers," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1847, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    • Sebastian Kranz, 2012. "Discounted Stochastic Games with Voluntary Transfers," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000423, David K. Levine.
15. Fagart, Thomas, 2022. "Collusion in capacity under irreversible investment," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
16. Yangbo Song & Mofei Zhao, 2023. "Cooperative teaching and learning of actions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(4), pages 1289-1327, November.
17. Kimmo Berg, 2016. "Elementary Subpaths in Discounted Stochastic Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 304-323, September.
18. Aislinn Bohren, 2016. "Using Persistence to Generate Incentives in a Dynamic Moral Hazard Problem," PIER Working Paper Archive 16-024, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 15 Oct 2016.
    • Aislinn Bohren, 2018. "Using Persistence to Generate Incentives in a Dynamic Moral Hazard Problem," PIER Working Paper Archive 18-015, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Apr 2018.
19. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2014. "Stochastic Games With Hidden States, Fourth Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 16-012, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 09 Nov 2017.
20. Yevgeny Tsodikovich & Xavier Venel & Anna Zseleva, 2022. "Folk Theorems in Repeated Games with Switching Costs," Working Papers hal-03888188, HAL.
21. Johannes Hörner & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2015. "Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 83(5), pages 1795-1848, September.
    • Johannes Horner & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2013. "Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1933, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    • Johannes Horner & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2013. "Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1933R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jan 2015.
    • Johannes Horner & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2014. "Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000881, David K. Levine.
22. Fudenberg, Drew & Ishii, Yuhta & Kominers, Scott Duke, 2014. "Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 487-514.
    • Drew Fudenberg & Yuhta Ishii & Scott Duke Kominers, 2012. "Delayed-Response Strategies in Repeated Games with Observation Lags," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000390, David K. Levine.
    • Fudenberg, Drew & Ishii, Yuhta & Kominers, Scott Duke, 2014. "Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags," Scholarly Articles 11880354, Harvard University Department of Economics.
23. Daehyun Kim, 2019. "Comparison of information structures in stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(1), pages 267-285, March.
24. J. Aislinn Bohren, 2011. "Stochastic Games in Continuous Time: Persistent Actions in Long-Run Relationships, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 14-033, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Aug 2014.
25. Daehyun Kim & Ichiro Obara, 2023. "On the Value of Information Structures in Stochastic Games," Papers 2308.09211, arXiv.org.
26. Aramendia, Miguel & Wen, Quan, 2020. "Myopic perception in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 1-14.
27. Dutta, Prajit K. & Siconolfi, Paolo, 2019. "Asynchronous games with transfers: Uniqueness and optimality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 46-75.
28. Aiba, Katsuhiko, 2014. "A folk theorem for stochastic games with private almost-perfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 58-66.
29. Jérôme Renault & Bruno Ziliotto, 2020. "Limit Equilibrium Payoffs in Stochastic Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 45(3), pages 889-895, August.
30. John Duggan, 2013. "A Folk Theorem for Repeated Elections with Adverse Selection," Wallis Working Papers WP64, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
31. Bohren, J. Aislinn, 2024. "Persistence in a dynamic moral hazard game," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(1), January.