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A theory of failed bank resolution: Technological change and political economics

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Cutura, Jannic Alexander, 2020. "Debt holder monitoring and implicit guarantees: did the BRRD improve market discipline?," ESRB Working Paper Series 111, European Systemic Risk Board.
  2. Jones, Laurence & Alsakka, Rasha & ap Gwilym, Owain & Mantovan, Noemi, 2022. "The impact of regulatory reforms on European bank behaviour: A dynamic structural estimation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 150(C).
  3. Korte, Josef, 2015. "Catharsis—The real effects of bank insolvency and resolution," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 16(C), pages 213-231.
  4. Marchionne, Francesco & Pisicoli, Beniamino & Fratianni, Michele, 2022. "Regulation, financial crises, and liberalization traps," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
  5. Gómez, Fabiana, 2015. "Failed bank takeovers and financial stability," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 16(C), pages 45-58.
  6. Korte, Josef, 2013. "Catharsis - The real effects of bank insolvency and resolution," Discussion Papers 21/2013, Deutsche Bundesbank.
  7. Ignatowski, Magdalena & Korte, Josef, 2014. "Resolution threats and bank discipline: What Europe can learn for the Single Resolution Mechanism from US experience," SAFE Policy Letters 33, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
  8. Cutura, Jannic Alexander, 2018. "Debt holder monitoring and implicit guarantees: Did the BRRD improve market discipline?," SAFE Working Paper Series 232, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
  9. Marinč, Matej & Rant, Vasja, 2014. "A cross-country analysis of bank bankruptcy regimes," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 13(C), pages 134-150.
  10. Ignatowski, Magdalena & Korte, Josef, 2014. "Wishful thinking or effective threat? Tightening bank resolution regimes and bank risk-taking," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 15(C), pages 264-281.
  11. Lai, Xiaobing & Yue, Shujing & Guo, Chong & Zhang, Xinhe, 2023. "Does FinTech reduce corporate excess leverage? Evidence from China," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 281-299.
  12. Kartik B. Athreya & Arantxa Jarque, 2015. "Understanding Living Wills," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue 3Q, pages 193-223.
  13. Cutura, Jannic Alexander, 2021. "Debt holder monitoring and implicit guarantees: Did the BRRD improve market discipline?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
  14. Caliendo, Frank N. & Guo, Nick L. & Smith, Jason M., 2018. "Policy uncertainty and bank bailouts," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 111-125.
  15. Gary Gorton & Andrew Winton, 2017. "Liquidity Provision, Bank Capital, and the Macroeconomy," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 49(1), pages 5-37, February.
  16. Lv, Panpan & Xiong, Hu, 2022. "Can FinTech improve corporate investment efficiency? Evidence from China," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
  17. Ignatowski, Magdalena & Korte, Josef & Werger, Charlotte, 2015. "Between capture and discretion - The determinants of distressed bank treatment and expected government support," Working Paper Series 1835, European Central Bank.
  18. Koresh Galil & Margalit Samuel & Offer Moshe Shapir & Wolf Wagner, 2023. "Bailouts and the modeling of bank distress," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 46(1), pages 7-30, February.
  19. Phoebe White & Tanju Yorulmazer, 2014. "Bank resolution concepts, trade-offs, and changes in practices," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Dec, pages 153-173.
  20. Leanza, Luca & Sbuelz, Alessandro & Tarelli, Andrea, 2021. "Bail-in vs bail-out: Bank resolution and liability structure," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
  21. Gabriel MITRACHE, 2018. "A game of bank resolution," Theoretical and Applied Economics, Asociatia Generala a Economistilor din Romania - AGER, vol. 0(Special), pages 209-217.
  22. Merrouche, Ouarda & Mariathasan, Mike & Werger, Charlotte, 2014. "Bailouts And Moral Hazard: How Implicit Government Guarantees Affect Financial Stability," CEPR Discussion Papers 10311, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  23. Andrzej R. Stopczyński, 2020. "Banki na progu upadłości – refleksje nad postępowaniem," Bank i Kredyt, Narodowy Bank Polski, vol. 51(5), pages 517-548.
  24. Padma Sharma, 2022. "Assessing Regulatory Responses to Banking Crises," Research Working Paper RWP 22-04, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
  25. De Caux, Robert & McGroarty, Frank & Brede, Markus, 2017. "The evolution of risk and bailout strategy in banking systems," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 468(C), pages 109-118.
  26. Michael Diemer & Uwe Vollmer, 2015. "What makes banking crisis resolution difficult? Lessons from Japan and the Nordic Countries," Eurasian Economic Review, Springer;Eurasia Business and Economics Society, vol. 5(2), pages 251-277, December.
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