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An Application of Global Games to Signalling Models

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  • Philipp C. Wichardt

Abstract

In a �rst attempt to apply the global games methodology to signalling games, Ewerhart and Wichardt (2004) analyse a beer-quiche type signalling game with additional imperfect information about the preferences of the receiver. Their approach allows them to dismiss the unreasonable pool- ing on quiche equilibrium. This paper revisits their example and discusses how an extension of the set of strategies for the sender a�ects the analy- sis. Interestingly, for an extended beer-quiche game, a unique equilibrium is selected while two equilibria are consistent with the Intuitive Criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987). Apart from the technical analysis, potential eco- nomic applications of the results, e.g. in a context of limit pricing and entry deterrence, are indicated.

Suggested Citation

  • Philipp C. Wichardt, "undated". "An Application of Global Games to Signalling Models," IEW - Working Papers 223, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    • Handle: RePEc:zur:iewwpx:223
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    File URL: https://www.econ.uzh.ch/apps/workingpapers/wp/iewwp223.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1982. "Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(2), pages 443-459, March.
    2. Paul R. Milgrom & Robert J. Weber, 1985. "Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 10(4), pages 619-632, November.
    3. Christian Ewerhart & Philipp Wichardt, "undated". "Signaling, Globality, and the Intuitive Criterion," IEW - Working Papers 189, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    4. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Fehr, Ernst & Fischbacher, Urs & Kosfeld, Michael, 2005. "Neuroeconomic Foundations of Trust and Social Preferences," IZA Discussion Papers 1641, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    2. Armin Falk & Ernst Fehr & Christian Zehnder, "undated". "The Behavioral Effects of Minimum Wages," IEW - Working Papers 247, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    3. Tania Singer & Ernst Fehr, 2005. "The Neuroeconomics of Mind Reading and Empathy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 340-345, May.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Global Games; Signalling; Equilibrium Selection; Intuitive Criterion; Limit Pricing;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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