A primer on damages of cartel suppliers: Determinants, standing US vs. EU and econometric estimation
AbstractWhile private actions for damages by customers against price-cartels receive much attention, the treatment of other groups affected by such conspiracies is largely unresolved. This article narrows the research gap with respect to suppliers to a downstream price cartel. First, we show that such suppliers incur losses driven by a direct quantity, a price and a cost effect. We then analyze whether suppliers are entitled to claim these losses as damages in the two leading competition law regimes. We find that, while the majority view in the US denies standing, the emerging position in the EU and important member states is to grant supplier standing. We argue that this can indeed be justified in view of the different institutional context and the goals assigned to the right to damages in the EU. We finally present an econometric approach based on residual demand estimation that allows to quantify all determinants of cartel suppliers' damages, thereby showing that supplier damage claims are a viable option in practice that can contribute to full compensation and greater cartel deterrence. --
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research in its series ZEW Discussion Papers with number 13-063.
Date of creation: 2013
Date of revision:
competition policy; cartels; suppliers; damage quantification; standing; private enforcement; comparative law;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-09-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2013-09-13 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2013-09-13 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-LAW-2013-09-13 (Law & Economics)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Laitenberger, Ulrich & Smuda, Florian, 2013. "Estimating consumer damages in cartel cases," ZEW Discussion Papers 13-069, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.